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ABSTRACT 
MIRI BESKEN: The assessment of verbal and imaginal encoding processes in the 
bizarreness effect 
(Under the direction of Neil W. Mulligan) 
 
The bizarreness effect refers to the finding that sentences that are contrary to the 
expectations or general world knowledge (e.g. The dog rode the bicycle down the street) 
produce superior memory as compared to  mundane and schema-consistent sentences 
(e.g. The dog chased the bicycle down the street). There are two major accounts that try 
to explain the role of the encoding processes in the emergence of the bizarreness effect. 
The imaginal encoding accounts contend that increased visual processing for the bizarre 
sentences is responsible for the superior memory. The verbal rehearsal accounts, on the 
other hand, argue for the role of increased verbal elaboration processes for the bizarre 
items in the emergence of the bizarreness effect.  This project aimed to discourage one of 
the processes during sentence encoding through the use of a concurrent working memory 
(WM) task known to selectively impair either verbal or visual WM, to investigate 
whether the size of the bizarreness effect decreases in any of the distraction conditions.  
Using tasks such as visual dynamic noise (Experiment 1), spatial tapping (Experiment 2) 
and visual patterns task (Experiment 3 & 6) that are well known to disrupt visual 
processing selectively, there was no decrement in the size of the bizarreness effect. 
Similarly, using tasks such as irrelevant speech (Experiment 1), articulatory suppression 
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(Experiment 2) and letter span task (Experiment 4 & 7) that are well known to disrupt 
verbal processing selectively,  there was no decrement in the size of the bizarreness 
effect. The results strongly argue against the role of visual and verbal WM processes in 
the emergence of the bizarreness effect. The results are discussed in terms of Baddeley’s 
working memory model and the attentional accounts of the bizarreness effect. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Bizarre Imagery and Memory Enhancement in Every-day Life 
The idea that bizarre images and events facilitate memory has been around 
since ancient times. Ad Herennium, the oldest surviving Latin book dating back to 90 
B.C., which focuses on the uses of rhetoric and persuasion, describes methods to use 
imagery to memorize speeches. The author of the book (attributed to Cicero, but author 
unknown) emphasized the use of ridiculous or weird images in order to maintain 
memories by describing how bizarre events stand out in our memory in everyday life:  
“We ought, then, to set up images of a kind that can adhere longest 
in the memory. And we shall do so if we establish likenesses as 
striking as possible; if we set up images that are not many or vague, 
but doing something; if we assign to them exceptional beauty or 
singular ugliness; if we dress some of them with crowns or purple 
cloaks, for example, so that the likeness may be more distinct to us; 
or if we somehow disfigure them, as by introducing one stained with 
blood or soiled with mud or smeared with red paint, so that its form 
is more striking, or by assigning certain comic effects to our images, 
for that, too, will ensure our remembering them more readily. The 
things we easily remember when they are real we likewise remember 
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without difficulty when they are figments, if they have been carefully 
delineated.”  
(Ad Herennium, cited in Yates, pp.9-10). 
The author also suggested that people who are practicing the art of memory 
should generate active, distinctive, surprising and uncommon images, with exceptional 
beauty or ugliness rather than common, traditional, unsurprising ones in order to 
remember information (Ad Herennium, cited in Yates, pp.9-10). 
Similarly, modern self-help books for memory enhancement have also advised 
that it is important to form uncommon associations between nouns in order to remember 
them. In their book on maximizing memory power, Lorayne and Lucas (1974), for 
example, emphasized the importance of absurdity in encoding the information.  
“Making the pictures ridiculous is what enables you to really see 
them; a logical picture is usually too vague. Once you see the 
ridiculous picture, it registers in your mind (Lucas & Lorayne, 
p.33)… When something assaults our senses in an unusual, great, 
unbelievable or ridiculous way, it stirs the mind. It is usually 
retained without effort. It is the ordinary, everyday things that we 
have trouble remembering. Forming ridiculous pictures helps to 
make them outstanding, novel or marvelous. (p. 34)”  
 If one had to remember the words envelope and tree, for example, Lorayne and 
Lucas suggest generating a ridiculous image of millions of envelopes growing on a tree.  
This, they argued, would enhance memory for those two items more than creating a 
common or mundane image, such as an envelope positioned next to a tree.  Similar 
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recommendations may be found in many self-help books on memory (e.g. Buzan, 1991; 
Lorayne, 2010; Trudeau, 1997). 
In addition to the ancient texts and self-help books about memory enhancement, 
many people seem to believe that forming bizarre images enhances memory. Even 
though this idea has been around for thousands of years, surprisingly little experimental 
research has been conducted until the last four decades.  Before going into the details, it 
is important to define bizarreness as the term is used in research, and explain how bizarre 
imagery has been operationalized and measured experimentally.  
Operational Definition and Manipulation of Bizarreness in Modern Research 
Bizarreness generally refers to items, sentences, pictures or mental images that are 
contrary to the expectations or general world knowledge of participants. Worthen (2006) 
defines bizarreness as an extreme form of distinctiveness, whereby the stimulus is in 
proportional minority relative to all previously stored knowledge. This definition of 
bizarreness also corresponds to Schmidt’s (1991) definition of secondary distinctiveness. 
Borrowing terms from William James for primary and secondary memory, Schmidt 
differentiated between primary and secondary distinctiveness by emphasizing an item’s 
standing in relation to the either currently activated memory schema, or long term store. 
Primary distinctiveness, in this sense, refers to an item which is only incongruent to the 
immediately activated structures (e.g., a word in red print in the context of a study list in 
which all other words are presented in black print). Secondary distinctiveness, on the 
other hand, refers to any item that stands out in terms of its incongruence to the general 
knowledge of participants.  Bizarreness, in this sense, refers to manipulations where the 
target item is unusual in relation to the general world knowledge of the participants. The 
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bizarre items are distinctive because the participants have rarely or never encountered an 
item, sentence, picture like that. For example, a bizarre sentence (e.g. The dog rode the 
bicycle down the street) is distinctive with respect to long term memory because it does 
not match the general experience or knowledge of the participants, and it has secondary 
distinctiveness regardless of whether it is presented in a list of common sentences (e.g. 
The dog chased the bicycle down the street) or other bizarre sentences.   
There have been three main methods in how researchers manipulate bizarreness at 
encoding: image generation, image presentation and sentence presentation. In the image 
generation method, participants are given examples of common and bizarre images prior 
to the encoding phase. During encoding, participants are presented with single nouns or 
noun pairs, along with a prompt specifying the type of image (common or bizarre) to be 
generated. Once the image is formed, the participant is asked to describe the image with a 
sentence while trying to maintain the image (e.g.  Cornoldi, Cavedon, De Beni & Pra 
Baldi, 1988; Weir & Richman, 1996).  
Bizarreness has also been manipulated through image presentation which, as the 
name implies, is implemented by presenting participants with images that depict common 
or bizarre scenes (Nicholas & Worthen, 2009; Worthen, 1997). In this type of 
manipulation, participants are asked to associate the items in the picture for a pending 
memory test. For example, two words (e.g. cigar, piano) can be associated with a 
common image depicting a cigar balanced on a piano, or with a bizarre image where the 
piano is smoking the cigar (Wollen, Weber, & Lowry, 1972).  
The sentence presentation method involves presenting participants with nouns 
(e.g. dog, bicycle, street) embedded in sentences that depict common images (e.g. the dog 
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chased the bicycle down the street) or bizarre images (e.g. the dog rode the bicycle down 
the street) and instructing the participants to form images that correspond to these 
sentences (McDaniel & Einstein, 1986). The bizarreness of sentences has been 
manipulated in different ways by various researchers. In particular, the sentences in the 
bizarre condition vary across studies on a continuum from unusual (or implausible) but 
possible, to conceivable (if extremely unlikely or impossible) to anomalous and 
incomprehensible. For example, McDaniel and colleagues have usually used bizarre 
sentences that are unusual but possible, such as The maid licked the ammonia off the table 
to conceivable but extremely unlikely or impossible, such as The dog rode the bicycle 
down the street. In other research, bizarreness is defined as a type of anomaly, in which 
an image may be difficult or impossible to imagine. Collyer, Jonides and Bevan (1979) 
employed bizarre sentences such as tablespoon blast lemonade. Similarly, Graf (1980) 
gave his participants either common (e.g. the tiny mouse frightened the cook) or 
anomalous sentences (e.g. the cheerful carpet exchanged the mouse). As we shall see, 
using different types of bizarre sentences has implications for when the bizarreness effect 
is found.  
In addition to the use of different bizarreness manipulations during encoding, the 
effects of bizarreness on memory are assessed with various measures of memory during 
the retrieval phase. The effect of bizarre imagery is often assessed with cued recall or free 
recall tests.  In cued- recall, participants are typically presented with one of the words 
from the study sentence, image, or pair, and asked to recall other information from the 
study stimulus, such as the other word in a pair (e.g. Nappe and Wollen, 1973) or the 
entire sentence (Hirshman, Whelley, & Palij, 1989).  Another way to test performance is 
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through the use of free recall. In this method, participants are asked to recall the images, 
the sentences or the nouns in any order that they can remember them.  
A short history in initial findings of the bizarreness effect 
Even though bizarre images have long been recommended as a way to enhance 
memory, surprisingly, experimental research on bizarreness and memory only started in 
the 1960s. Earlier studies on the use of imagery in paired-associates learning were too 
unsystematic to be considered manipulations of bizarreness (e.g., Wallace, Turner and 
Perkins, 1957).  Delin (1968, 1969) conducted the initial studies which actually examined 
the effects of bizarre imagery on memory performance relative to a rote rehearsal 
condition. In a list learning experiment, Delin (1969) instructed the participants in the 
experimental group to connect the current item to the previous item by thinking up as 
fantastic a connecting image as they can between the two words.  For example, if the 
words pig and piano were presented in sequence, the participant might create an image of 
a pig playing the piano. The participants in the control group, on the other hand, were not 
given a specific encoding strategy and were simply instructed to memorize the presented 
words in the allocated time. The results indicated that participants who used the fantastic 
images showed superior memory than the control group in a free recall task. However, 
this study failed to assess the bizarreness of images systematically, as participants were 
not asked about the images that they formed for each pair of words. Consequently, the 
positive effects found could be simply due to the use of imagery rather than bizarre 
imagery, per se. 
Another initial technique to investigate the effects of bizarre imagery was the use 
of a peg-word system. In this procedure, participants first memorized a list of rhyming 
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peg-words that correspond to each number (e.g. one is BUN, two is SHOE, three is 
TREE, four is DOOR, five is HIVE, etc.). Then, they were presented with the words in 
the target list. As each word in the to-be-learned list was presented, participants were 
instructed to form a bizarre image between the peg word and the target word in the new 
list. For example, if the first word was pencil, participants would imagine a pencil in a 
bun. Using the peg-word method, Bugelski, Kidd and Segmen (1968) asked participants 
in the experimental group to associate the peg-words to the list words in 2, 4 or 8 seconds 
for each word in the target list in a between subjects design. The control group, on the 
other hand, was not informed about the peg-word mnemonic even though they also 
previously learned the number-peg word associations. The results indicated that 
participants who were given 4 or 8 seconds in the experimental group performed better 
than the control group. Still, the type of images that participants generated could not be 
assessed in terms of how unusual they were, because participants were again not asked 
about the types of images that they created. 
This method was criticized by subsequent studies on two different grounds: First, 
there was no direct comparison between common and bizarre images, because the 
participants were instructed to generate bizarre images in all imagery conditions. Second, 
there was no way to know whether the images were bizarre or not, because participants 
were never asked to describe the images. Subsequent studies overcame these limitations 
by examining the effects of bizarre images on learning lists of nouns. Nappe and Wollen 
(1973) gave participants instructions to create either common or bizarre mental images 
for each word pair. Before the experiment began, the participants were given operational 
definitions and examples for both common and bizarre mental images. Then, participants 
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were presented with 48 word pairs along with the type of image to be formed presented 
next to each word pair. Each participant was asked to press a button as soon as they 
formed the images and to give a verbal description of the mental image, for which the 
level of bizarreness was judged later by four different judges.  At test, participants were 
given a cued-recall test, in which one noun from a pair was presented as a cue to recall 
the other noun. Surprisingly, the results indicated no difference in cued recall for 
common and bizarre images. 
The foregoing manipulation of bizarre imagery has also been criticized by 
subsequent studies on the ground that the when the participants generate the mental 
image, the experimenter control is low and the level of bizarreness cannot be directly 
manipulated. In order to avoid this, Collyer, Jonides and Bevan (1972) conducted a study 
in which participants were asked to construct images for noun-verb-noun triplets. In a 
between subjects design, half of the participants received common triplets such as 
tablespoon-measure-lemonade, shotgun-blast-building. The rest of the participants 
received bizarre triplets formed by swapping the verbs of the sentences (e.g. tablespoon-
blast-lemonade, shotgun-measure- building). The participants were told that they should 
construct images in which the first noun performs the action on the second noun. At 
retrieval, participants were asked to write down all the nouns that they could recall in no 
particular order. The results revealed superior recall in the common imagery condition 
than the bizarre condition, a result in conflict with the common belief that bizarre 
imagery helps memory performance more than the common imagery. Cox and Wollen 
(1981) reported a similar advantage for common imagery over bizarre imagery, also 
using pure lists at encoding. 
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However, other research showed superiority for bizarre sentences. Merry and 
Graham (1978), for example, gave their participants mixed lists of bizarre and common 
sentences with either intentional or incidental memory instructions. As in previous 
studies, participants created an image of each sentence, followed by a rating of image 
bizarreness. The results indicated that the incidental condition led to the superior memory 
for bizarre items in free recall compared to common items. The superiority of the bizarre 
sentences was diminished in the intentional condition, but was still present.  
Given all the conflicting findings, an early review of the literature contended that 
the inconsistent findings put in question the common belief that bizarre imagery leads to 
better recall (Yarmey, 1984). Yarmey argued that the effects of bizarre imagery might be 
born out of the distinctiveness and elaboration of information. When participants have to 
process images that are bizarre, they attend to them more, and as a consequence they 
elaborate them more. Thus, it is not necessarily the bizarreness of the images that produce 
the effect, but it is the level of effort put into the sentence, the image or the word pair in 
order to associate and understand it.  
The new era in bizarre imagery effect and imagery debate 
Yarmey’s view was partially challenged by a series of experiments conducted by 
McDaniel and Einstein (1986). In a classical experiment, McDaniel and Einstein (1986) 
presented participants with either a pure list of common sentences (e.g. The maid spilled 
the ammonia on the table), a pure list of bizarre sentences (e.g. The maid licked the 
ammonia off the table), or a mixed list of common and bizarre sentences. During the 
study phase, participants were instructed to form an interactive image of the sentence and 
rate the image for its vividness. This was followed by a surprise free recall test. For pure 
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lists, recall was similar for bizarre and common sentences. For mixed lists, on the other 
hand, the recall of bizarre sentences was significantly higher than common sentences 
(Experiment 1). In this same series of experiments, they also investigated the effects of 
imagery instructions during the study phase. Participants were randomly assigned either 
to imaginal processing or semantic elaboration groups. In the imaginal processing group, 
participants were instructed to create a mental image of the sentences presented to them 
and then judge the vividness of the images. The participants in the semantic elaboration 
group, on the other hand, were asked to judge the degree to which the relation among the 
three underlined words in each sentence was unusual and then rate it on a 5-point scale. 
At test, participants were asked to recall all the underlined nouns that they could 
remember. The analysis of the total noun recall revealed an interaction between the 
sentence type and type of processing such that participants assigned to the imaginal 
processing group recalled more bizarre items than common items, whereas participants 
assigned to the semantic elaboration group recalled approximately equal numbers of 
bizarre and common items (Experiment 2).     
In a review of the previous literature, Einstein and McDaniel (1987) outlined the 
necessary conditions for the bizarre imagery effect to be displayed. They contended that 
bizarre imagery effect is consistently obtained in mixed lists with free recall and imagery 
instructions. The finding that mixed lists followed by free recall produce the bizarreness 
effect has been replicated in many subsequent studies (e.g. Hirshman, Whelley & Palij, 
1989; Waddill & McDaniel, 1998; McDaniel, Einstein, DeLosh, May & Brady, 1995).  
However, the necessity of the imagery instructions has been controversial. 
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For example, Kroll and Tu (1988) questioned the necessity of imagery 
instructions by giving participants mixed lists of bizarre and common sentences with 
different types of ratings designed to increase or decrease imaginal processing at 
encoding. In one experiment, one group of participants was given imagery instructions, 
where they were asked to generate images for the presented sentences and rate them for 
the vividness. The other group was given semantic processing instructions, where they 
were asked to judge the degree of bizarreness between the nouns in the sentence 
(bizarreness ratings). The results revealed a main effect for the bizarreness, with bizarre 
nouns recalled more than common nouns. Yet, neither the main effect of instruction nor 
its interaction with the bizarreness was significant, indicating that the superior memory 
performance for bizarre items is obtained even with instructions that emphasize semantic 
elaboration. Moreover, the vividness ratings for bizarre sentences were always lower than 
the ratings for common sentences. Thus, unlike McDaniel and Einstein (1986), Kroll and 
Tu (1988) argued that it is not necessarily the imaginal encoding that leads to increased 
recall on two grounds: First, that bizarreness effect was produced even when a semantic 
orienting task such as bizarreness rating is employed, even though bizarreness rating does 
not necessarily entail imaginal processing. Second, if the visual distinctiveness of the 
bizarre images is the reason for memory performance facilitation in the bizarre condition, 
one would expect the vividness of bizarre images to be rated higher than common 
images. Yet, research show that the vividness ratings for bizarre sentences are almost 
always lower than the ratings for the common sentences. Thus, Kroll and Tu (1988) 
argued that the bizarre imagery effect is a misnomer, and the superior performance for 
bizarre items should be called the bizarre context effect. 
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The use of sentences for studying the bizarreness effect raises additional issues 
because participants first have to understand the sentences and then imagine them, which 
will require some verbal processes. One way that researchers tried to overcome this 
problem is to ask participants to generate bizarre and common images for nouns, without 
providing sentences. Cornoldi, Cavedon, De Beni and Pra Baldi (1988) used this strategy, 
manipulating encoding instructions. In the imaginal processing condition, participants 
were told to generate an image for each noun, describe the image and use the rest of time 
to maintain the image. In the verbal processing condition, participants were asked to 
generate a sentence for each noun and rehearse it in the allotted time. The type of image 
or the sentence to be generated was manipulated within subjects as common and bizarre. 
Before the encoding phase, participants were given operational definitions and examples 
for bizarre and common items. At retrieval, participants were asked to recall as many 
nouns as they could.  Free recall performance revealed greater recall in the bizarre than 
common condition. This effect was qualified by a marginally significant interaction such 
that the superior memory for the bizarre items was only significant in the imaginal 
processing group.  Cornoldi et al (1988) argued that the use of imagery is especially 
important in obtaining the bizarreness effect, because the superiority for the bizarre 
images is only obtained in the imagery condition.  
This study was criticized by Weir and Richman (1996) on several grounds. Weir 
and Richman argued that the interaction between instruction type and type of sentence 
only reached a lenient level for rejection of the null hypothesis (p<.10), and that this 
might only be due to sampling error. In addition to this, Cornoldi et al (1988) only used 
two groups in their study. One of the groups generated an image and described it with a 
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sentence. The other group just generated a sentence. Thus, there was no group that only 
imagined the bizarre event without being asked to describe the image, resulting in the 
confounding factor of using both imaginal and verbal processing in imaginal elaboration 
instructions. However, the necessity of imagery can only be supported through the use of 
a group that actually imagines the event without describing it. Consequently, Weir and 
Richman (1996) gave their participants three kinds of instructions to generate common 
and bizarre sentences from single nouns or noun pairs: The imagery group received 
instructions to create an image using the nouns and focus on the image. The verbal 
rehearsal group was instructed to write a sentence using the materials presented and to 
reread the sentence until the presentation of the next word pair. The third group was 
instructed to both create an image and write a sentence describing the image and then 
focus on the image in the remaining time. The bizarreness effect occurred in all groups 
regardless of the instructions given to the participants. Weir and Richman argued that this 
result might be a consequence of both verbal and imaginal processes, and that imaginal 
encoding is not critical in obtaining the bizarreness effect. 
The debate about the role of imagery in the bizarreness effect has been 
investigated in other ways as well. Anderson and Buyer (1994) reasoned that if imagining 
the sentences is the fundamental factor in obtaining the bizarreness effect, then 
participants with better imaging skills should show an increased bizarreness effect, 
whereas people with poor imaging ability should show comparable recall levels for 
bizarre and common items. They presented participants with mixed lists of common and 
bizarre sentences, followed by a recall test, and a battery of imagery ability tests. They 
found no correlation between imagery ability and recall. Further, those who rated images 
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as less vivid showed a larger bizarreness effect. Thus, Anderson and Buyer (1994) 
concluded that it is not the imaginal processing per se that produces the phenomenon, but 
rather it is the type of instruction that causes participants to engage in deep rather than 
shallow processing.    
Another way researchers have investigated the effects of imagery are with 
incidental vs. intentional memory instructions. Most of the studies reviewed so far 
employed incidental memory instructions, in which participants are told that the study 
investigates individual differences in imaging ability. Hirshman et al (1989) argued that 
intentional learning instructions encourage less imaginal processing and more semantic 
elaboration than overt imaginal processing instructions, because participants try to repeat 
the verbal sequence and elaborate it rather than focus on the image. If the bizarre imagery 
is due to semantic elaboration and not imaginal processing, the bizarreness effect should 
still occur with the intentional memory instructions. Thus, Hirshman et al. (1989) 
presented participants with a mixed list of bizarre and common sentences, and told them 
that they would be tested on their memory for these sentences.  The participants were not 
asked to create mental images or perform vividness ratings. The free recall test yielded a 
main effect for bizarreness, with better free recall performance for bizarre than common 
sentences. Thus, Hirshman et al concluded that the bizarreness effect is independent of 
the imaginal processing instructions. Yet, one problem with the use of Hirshman et al 
(1989) argument is that even if the participants are not given any explicit visual orienting 
tasks, they can still spontaneously come up with a strategy to visualize the sentences, in 
which case they will do some additional processing for each sentence, helping their 
performance.  
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Hirshman’s finding was challenged by Burns (1996).  In a 2 (sentence type: 
bizarre vs. common) x 2 (instructions: intentional vs. incidental) design, participants were 
informed that they were participating in an experiment about imagery ability. The task 
was to form a mental image of the sentences that they read, followed by vividness 
ratings. The participants in the incidental group were told that the relationship between 
imagery and problem-solving would be measured, whereas the participants in the 
intentional learning conditions were told that their imagery ability would be related to 
their ability to remember the underlined words in the sentences. The results revealed an 
interaction between for the two learning conditions and the sentence type such that the 
recall in the incidental condition revealed the bizarreness effect whereas recall for 
common and bizarre items was equivalent in the intentional learning condition. Burns 
(1996) argued that the intentional learning instructions diminish the effect even if it does 
not totally eliminate it. He also contended that this finding might be a consequence of 
verbal elaboration at encoding. To explain, intentional learning instructions might foster 
elaborative rehearsal of the items, which leads to use of other cues than distinctiveness, 
decreasing the discrepancy between bizarre and common sentences. However, the 
findings of Burns were not replicated in other research. Merry and Graham (1978) 
obtained a robust bizarreness effect with intentional memory instructions, as did Worthen 
and Roark (2002). Thus, research using intentional memory instructions do not appear to 
resolve the imagery-verbal rehearsal debate for two reasons. First, intentional memory 
instructions yield inconsistent results. Second, the assumption that intentional instructions 
enhance verbal processing and diminish imaginal processing has not been tested directly. 
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The intentional memory instructions may induce imaginal processes rather than verbal 
rehearsal if the participants believe that this will enhance their memory.    
Worthen (1997) argued that in the classical bizarreness paradigm, the requirement 
to read and understand sentences entails verbal processing, and the requirement to rate 
vividness entails imaginal processing. Thus, it is difficult to separate the effects of 
imaginal and verbal processing on the bizarreness effect. He reasoned that if the 
bizarreness effect is obtained even when the formation of mental images is controlled and 
imaginal instructions are withheld, then the bizarreness effect does not depend on the 
imaginal capacity. In order to test this idea, he presented participants bizarre and common 
sentences in four different conditions. In the image condition, participants were provided 
with black and white drawings of bizarre and common items, and asked to form a mental 
image of the drawing after it disappeared and rate the image for its vividness. In the 
sentence condition, participants were presented with common and bizarre sentences and 
were asked to rate the sentences for pleasantness. In the sentence plus image generation 
condition, participants were given sentences, asked to form images and rate them for 
vividness. Last of all, in the sentence plus image provision condition, participants were 
presented with the picture while reading the sentence. Once the picture disappeared, 
participants were asked to create a mental image of the picture and rate it for its 
vividness. The results yielded a main effect for bizarreness, regardless of the instructions 
given to the participants. Unlike the results by McDaniel and Einstein (1986), the 
pleasantness rating, hypothesized to induce high degrees of semantic processing, lead to 
increased memory for the bizarre items. Moreover, even when participants make up their 
own images or are provided with the images, the findings essentially failed to lead to any 
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differences between the conditions. Thus, Worthen (1997) concluded that the effects are 
not limited to a specific set of images or to situations where images are unconstrained or 
self-generated and that the bizarreness effect is independent of imaginal and verbal 
processes.  
Some other evidence for the verbal elaboration view comes from research 
investigating the effects of humor on the bizarreness effect. Worthen and Deschamps 
(2008) asked their participants to generate bizarre and common images for word triplets 
and say aloud a sentence that described each image. The participants came back 15 weeks 
later. In the meanwhile, all the sentences were judged by an independent group for humor 
and bizarreness. The free and cued-recall results showed that the original participants 
remembered more bizarre than common sentences only if the sentences were humorous. 
Worthen and Deschamps (2008) concluded that humor is an important element in 
obtaining the bizarreness effect, because it induces an exaggerated tendency to process 
the differences between the context and the item, leading to increased verbal elaboration 
for the bizarre events.   
Another line of research that has been interpreted as supporting the verbal 
rehearsal account is the moderating effect of study time in producing the bizarreness 
effect. One of the factors that influences the bizarreness effect is the type of stimulus 
used. As described earlier, the bizarre sentences vary across studies on a continuum from 
atypical and possible to anomalous and incomprehensible. The bizarreness effect is 
consistently obtained in research using mixed lists of sentences that are bizarre and 
imaginable (Hirshman, Whelley &Palij, 1989; Waddill & McDaniel, 1998; McDaniel, 
Einstein, DeLosh, May & Brady, 1995). On the other hand, when bizarreness is defined 
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as a type of anomaly, the bizarreness effect is often not obtained (e.g. Collyer, Jonides & 
Bevan, 1972). Yet, even anomalous sentences can produce the classical bizarreness effect 
if participants are given sufficient time at encoding.  For example, Imai and Richman 
(1991) manipulated the degree of plausibility of sentences as common (e.g. The maid 
spilled the ammonia on the table), bizarre (e.g., The maid licked the ammonia off the 
table) or anomalous (The table dropped the maid out of the ammonia) At a processing 
time of 7 seconds, bizarre sentences were better remembered than common sentences, 
whereas the memory performance for anomalous sentences was equivalent to common 
sentences. In contrast, when participants were given 35 seconds for each sentence at 
encoding, the bizarreness effect was obtained for both bizarre and anomalous sentences. 
Imai and Richman (1991) argued that the moderation of time on plausibility might be a 
sentence reorganization effect rather than an imagery effect. In this sense, common 
sentences do not violate the expectations of the participants; thus, they are not 
reorganized verbally. Bizarre sentences, in contrast, are contrary to the world knowledge 
of the participants and violate their expectations. Thus, participants try to understand the 
sentences by relating the bizarre sentences into common sentences, which produces a 
richer, more detailed memory trace, leading to increased recall. Since anomalous 
sentences are harder to understand and re-organize verbally, longer duration is necessary 
for the bizarreness effect to appear for anomalous sentences as compared to bizarre and 
common sentences. Thus, it is the spontaneous re-organization of the sentence into a 
more logical form that leads to better memory.  
However, the same finding may be explained just as well with a hypothesis that 
depends on imaginal processes. Wollen and Margres (1987) explained the bizarreness 
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effect in terms of the imagery-multiprocess model. According to this model, when a 
participant processes a sentence, the participant first begins with one or more schematic 
images from long term memory. For common items, the process is easy: For example, if 
participants are given the sentence The dog chased the bicycle down the street, 
participants have to choose a schematic image of a dog and a bike and imagine the dog 
chasing the bike without making too many transformations on each visual element of the 
image. Bizarre images, on the other hand, require more transformations for each element, 
because the schematic images of the elements have to be altered. For example, when the 
participants receive the sentence The dog rode the bicycle down the street, the schematic 
dog image has to be transformed so that the hind legs of the dog reach the pedals, and the 
paws reach the handle bars, leading to increased visual elaborations for the image. 
According to this view, it is the nature of the elaborations and the number of changes 
required to convert a schematic image into a bizarreness image that leads to increased 
memory performance. In some cases, though, the images will not be easy to form, 
especially for bizarre sentences, which allow this account to explain the effects of study 
time on obtaining the bizarreness effect with anomalous sentences. Therefore, the effect 
of increased encoding time in producing the effect with anomalous sentences might be 
due to either verbal rehearsal processes, whereby the sentence is reorganized, or to 
imagery processes, whereby more visual transformations lead to increased memory 
performance.      
Increased encoding duration has a similar effect on complex bizarre sentences as 
it does on the plausibility of the stimulus: For complex sentences, longer study durations 
are required to obtain the bizarreness effect, as occurs with anomalous stimuli.  Much of 
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the research on the bizarreness effect employed sentences which are short, concrete and 
simple like “The maid licked the ammonia off the table”, and participants were asked to 
remember the nouns maid, ammonia and table. The simple short sentences produce the 
typical bizarreness effect in mixed-list designs (e.g. Hirshman, Whelley & Palij, 1989; 
McDaniel, Einstein, DeLosh, May & Brady, 1995; Waddill & McDaniel, 1998).  
However, the employment of more complex sentences yields inconsistent results. Kroll, 
Schepeler and Angin (1986) operationalized complexity with the number of modifiers 
and actions in a sentence. By this definition, a simple common sentence employs only 
one verb with no modifiers for the nouns (e.g., The ant goes around a comb). A complex 
sentence, on the other hand, includes modifiers for the nouns and more descriptive 
information, such as A large, black ant crawls in and out of the comb for the common 
version, and A large black ant carefully fixes its hair with a plastic comb as an example 
of a complex bizarre sentence. With these stimuli (and a relatively brief study duration of 
self-paced study), Kroll et al (1986) failed to obtain any differences between complex 
common and bizarre sentences.   
Using only the complex sentences, Richman (1994) manipulated the encoding 
time per sentence (15, 30 or 60 seconds) and used free recall as the memory test. Free 
recall was superior for the bizarre than common sentences for the 30 and 60 second study 
times, but there was no bizarreness advantage in the 15 second condition.  Richman 
argued that this effect was a consequence of verbal comprehension and reorganization 
processes. To explain, when participants are given sufficient time, they spontaneously 
reorganize bizarre sentences into common and meaningful ones, thus encoding the 
bizarre sentences in both bizarre and common versions, leading to more retrieval routes 
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later than for common sentences, which are only encoded in one way. Because complex 
sentences are harder to understand than simple sentences, it takes longer to reorganize 
complex bizarre sentences; thus, this reorganization can only produce an effect for longer 
study durations. Even though Richman (1994) argued that the effect is a consequence of 
verbal rehearsal, this finding might again be a result of imaginal processes.  In line with 
Wollen and Margres’s imagery multiprocess hypothesis (1987), when participants are 
given extra adjectives such as tired and crabby, it might take longer for the participants to 
integrate the adjectives into the image, leading to the bizarreness effect at longer 
encoding times.  
To sum up, the encoding processes employed in obtaining the bizarreness effect 
have been a source of controversy. Some researchers have proposed that visual imagery 
forms the basis of the classical superiority for bizarre items for two reasons. First, the 
bizarreness effect is not always obtained with instructions that emphasize semantic 
elaboration. Moreover, the intentional memory instruction, which is hypothesized to rely 
heavily on semantic elaboration instructions rather than imagery generation, leads to 
decrements in the effect size for the bizarreness manipulation (at least in some studies). 
Theoretically, two variants of the imagery hypothesis exist. McDaniel and Einstein 
(1986) claimed that bizarre images are more visually distinctive than common images, 
leading to increased memory performance. Many other studies have tried to assess the 
importance of the visual distinctiveness and how it increases recall of bizarre items 
(McDaniel, Dornburg & Guynn, 2005; McDaniel, Einstein, DeLosh, May & Brady, 
1995; Waddill & McDaniel, 1998). Wollen and Margres (1987), on the other hand, 
claimed that participants put more effort into generating the bizarre images, because 
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bizarre images cannot be obtained by using schematic pictures of the elements and have 
to be transformed more than common elements, a form of visual elaboration leading to 
superior memory.  
In contrast, other researchers argue that imagery is not necessary for obtaining the 
bizarreness effect for several reasons. First, the effect is obtained even in studies that do 
not employ imagery instructions (Weir & Richman, 1996; Wollen, 1997). Second, there 
is no correlation between participants’ self-reported use of imagery and the recall rates 
(Anderson & Buyer, 1994). Moreover, the participants with higher imagery capabilities 
do not show an increased superiority for bizarre items. Third, intentional memory 
instructions, which assume an increased reliance on semantic elaboration, yield contrary 
results. The proponents of verbal rehearsal processes explain the superior memory for 
bizarre items through the use of sentence re-organization or other verbal elaboration 
accounts. Bizarre sentences require greater modification or semantic elaboration for 
complete comprehension than do common sentences, leading to better memory.  
Disentangling the role of verbal and imaginal processes in obtaining the 
bizarreness effect has been challenging, because most extant research employed 
sentences. Even when participants are asked to generate common and bizarre images 
from nouns or noun pairs, participants are typically asked to describe the image to the 
experimenter as a manipulation check, leading to the use of sentences and potential 
verbal elaboration. A consideration of a study by Worthen (1997) highlights the typical 
ambiguity.  Worthen reasoned that if the bizarreness effect is obtained even when the 
formation of mental images is controlled and imaginal instructions are withheld, the 
bizarreness effect must not depend on the imaginal capacity. Even though this 
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interpretation is reasonable, his manipulations of imagery and verbal processes were not 
necessarily unambiguous. For example, in one condition, the participants were shown a 
picture and after it disappeared, they were asked to regenerate the image and rate it for 
vividness. This manipulation aimed to focus on imaginal processing (and minimize the 
use of verbal elaboration). In another condition, participants were presented with bizarre 
and common sentences, and given semantic elaboration instructions. The bizarreness 
effect was found in both conditions, leading Worthen to conclude that bizarreness effect 
can occur due to either verbal elaboration or imagery processes. Even though this is an 
interesting methodology, the manipulations do not fully rule out the employment of the 
verbal or imagery processes. To explain, participants may spontaneously generate an 
image of the sentence in the semantic elaboration condition, giving them increased routes 
for retrieval. For example, a participant in the semantic elaboration condition, reading the 
sentence The dog rode the bicycle down the street, may spontaneously generate the image 
of a dog on a bicycle. Similarly, participants who are given images with imagery 
instructions may try to verbalize the event and try to assess its unusualness in order to 
understand the picture. For example, if the participant sees the drawing of a dog on a 
bicycle, they might verbally elaborate on the situation by thinking how counterfactual 
this picture is, relative to all their world knowledge, leading to increased verbal 
elaboration.     
Perhaps a better way to disentangle the contribution of imaginal and verbal 
processes to the bizarreness effect would be to selectively impair either verbal or 
imaginal processes separately in order to see if the bizarreness effect still persists when 
one of the processes is impaired. Thus, if a situation could be engineered to disrupt either 
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verbal or the imaginal processes during the encoding of the sentences, we might be able 
to better determine the basis of the effect. For example, if the bizarreness effect were still 
obtained while the participants’ imaginal processes were impaired, this would indicate 
that imaginal processes are not responsible for the effect. On the other hand, if the 
bizarreness effect were obtained when verbal processes were disrupted, we could infer 
that verbal processes are not the basis of the effect. One way to achieve this is to use 
secondary working memory tasks, which employ verbal or visual working memory 
during encoding. In order to explain how this would work, it is necessary to briefly 
review the mechanics of working memory.          
Working Memory 
One of the most prominent models of working memory was devised by Baddeley 
and his colleagues (Baddeley, 2003; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). According to this model, 
working memory is composed of multiple limited-capacity subsystems, consisting of a 
central executive with two slave systems: phonological loop and visuo-spatial sketchpad. 
The phonological loop is involved in processing verbal information. It comprises a 
phonological store, which can hold sound based memory traces for a few seconds before 
they fade, and an articulatory process that is analogous to subvocal speech. It is also 
referred to as verbal working memory. Visuo-spatial sketchpad is involved in processing 
visual and spatial stimuli, such as color, shape and spatial location. Both of these systems 
have limited capacity, and can only process, maintain and store a certain amount of 
information within a certain time. The visuo-spatial sketchpad is also referred to as visual 
working memory. The central executive, an attentional system, controls and coordinates 
the functioning of the two slave systems (Baddeley, 2003). The phonological loop is 
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hypothesized to facilitate language acquisition and processing verbal information, where 
visuo-spatial sketchpad is implicated in nonverbal intelligence. The central executive is 
hypothesized to achieve more complex tasks such as reasoning and comprehension, with 
the help of the slave systems. 
1
 
There is compelling evidence that these two slave systems work independently of 
each other.  For example, the functioning of the phonological loop remains largely 
unaffected when paired with a secondary task requiring visual or spatial processing. In a 
classical experiment, Baddeley, Logie, Bressi, Della Sala and Spinler (1986) investigated 
performance on two demanding tasks. The first task was a digit span task, in which 
participants heard digits and immediately recalled them in their original order. This task 
requires the use of phonological loop as the participant has to process and retain verbal 
information. The second task was a perceptuo-motor tracking task, in which participants 
were required to follow a randomly moving light patch on the screen with a light 
sensitive pen. This task demands the use of visual sketchpad, as tracking can only be 
achieved through processing visual and spatial information. Each task was calibrated in 
isolation. The digit span was adjusted so that each participant was given as many 
numbers at each trial as they could retain. Similarly, the speed of the light patch was 
adjusted so that the participants were only able to track it 40-60% of the time. Baddeley 
et al (1986) hypothesized that if the working memory consists of one flexible system, the 
performance in the verbal task should drop when it is performed concurrently with the 
visual task.  On the other hand, if the working memory consists of two different systems, 
                                                          
1 Baddeley (2003) has also introduced a third slave system called episodic buffer which is hypothesized to link 
information across domains to form integrated units of visual, spatial, and verbal information. However, since it is not 
directly relevant to the current research, it will not be explained any further.  
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verbal and visual, working independently of each other, the performance on one task 
should not be diminished by the performance on the other. The results showed that 
performance on the digit task did not change when coupled with the light patch task, 
providing evidence that the phonological loop is not affected by the presence of the 
secondary task when the secondary task involves visual and/or spatial processing. 
There is also evidence that performance on immediate visual-memory tasks is 
unaffected by secondary tasks that employ the phonological loop, but is severely 
impaired by secondary tasks that use the visual sketchpad.  Measures of immediate verbal 
memory show the opposite pattern. In an experiment by Logie, Zucco and Baddeley 
(1990), participants were given one of two short-term span tasks. In the visual span task, 
a matrix of randomly colored black and white squares was presented, then the matrix 
disappeared for 2 seconds, then the matrix reappeared with a color change for one of the 
squares. Participants were asked to point out which square had changed in color. The 
other task was a letter span task. For this task, each letter appeared sequentially at the 
center of a computer screen. Then, the sequence disappeared for two seconds, and then 
the same sequence was presented to the participant again, with one of the letters changed. 
Participants were asked to identify the changed letter. All participants were exposed to 
these two tasks in counterbalanced order. Concurrently, they also were presented with a 
secondary task. Half of the group received an arithmetic task, where the experimenter 
asked participants to add numbers given to them and say the obtained number aloud. The 
other half of the group generated an image of a three by five matrix of squares, for which 
the experimenter read aloud a sequence of instructions for the squares to be filled and left 
blank. When arithmetic was used as the secondary task, letter span performance was 
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significantly lower than the visual span task. In contrast, when the secondary number 
matrix task was used, visual span performance dropped substantially more than the letter 
span task. The selective decline in the primary task performance when the secondary task 
employs the same slave system confirms further that visual sketchpad and phonological 
loop are qualitatively different from each other, and can be selectively disrupted with an 
appropriate secondary task. 
The detrimental effects of employing the same system for primary and secondary 
tasks are observed not only with immediate recall, but also over brief delays. Cocchini, 
Logie, Della Sala and McPherson (2002) tested the effects of a few different tasks for an 
analysis of the detrimental effects of the secondary tasks on the primary task on a longer 
retention period of 15 seconds.  In experiment 1, participants were given three different 
tasks: perceptuo-motor tracking, in which they followed a ladybug on the screen with a 
light sensitive pen; serial digit recall, in which they recalled a series of numbers in the 
order presented; and visual pattern recall, in which they were presented with a matrix of 
randomly filled squares and then were asked to reconstruct the pattern in an empty 
matrix. During the experiment, participants first carried out all the tasks individually. 
Then, participants carried out the tasks concurrently in pairs of two. Digit recall was not 
impaired by either the tracking or the visual pattern recall task. On the other hand, 
performance dropped significantly in the visual pattern recall when carried out 
concurrently with the tracking task, but not with the serial digit recall task.  In 
Experiment 2, the perceptuo-motor tracking task was replaced with the articulatory 
suppression task, a manipulation that has been shown to disrupt the contents of verbal 
working memory. In this task, participants are asked to repeat a word aloud at a certain 
28 
 
rate (e.g. saying the at a rate of three times per second). Experiment 2 interpolated this 
task with serial digit recall and visual pattern recall to see whether this task would lead 
differentially decrease performance. The results complemented Experiment 1: visual 
pattern recall was disrupted by neither articulatory suppression nor the digit serial recall. 
In contrast, digit serial recall performance dropped significantly when combined with the 
other tasks. More importantly, digit span recall was significantly worse when combined 
with articulatory suppression than with visual pattern recall. This study confirms that 
using two tasks that employ the same working-memory subsystem impairs both tasks 
significantly, whereas when two tasks employ different subsystems, minimal impairment 
occurs for either task.  
In the current study, using two different concurrent tasks that impair one of the 
slave systems but leave the other one intact can help disentangle the effects of verbal 
rehearsal and visual imagery on the bizarreness effect. If the bizarreness effect is 
diminished or eliminated by a distractor task that employs verbal working memory (i.e., 
the phonological loop), this would indicate that verbal rehearsal processes are responsible 
for the effect. On the other hand, if the effect is impaired when a visual distractor task is 
used, it would be consistent with a visual-imagery account of the bizarreness effect.   
Use of Visual Distractors in Working Memory 
One of the tasks that have been known to interfere with visual working memory is 
the irrelevant pictures task (Logie, 1986). In this task, participants are presented with 
irrelevant pictures of living and non-living objects that change constantly, with the 
instruction that they should ignore the pictures without looking away from the screen. 
Logie (1986) presented his participants with irrelevant pictures as a secondary task as 
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they were trying to memorize short lists of words presented on the headphones, with two 
different memory instructions: rote rehearsal and pegword mnemonics. Participants in the 
rote rehearsal condition were told to commit the words to memory by adding each word 
to the one heard previously and to repeat them subvocally in the order that they were 
presented. Participants in the visual mnemonic condition first memorized a group of peg 
words (one-BUN, two-SHOE, three-TREE, etc.) to be associated to the target list. Then, 
as the word in the target list was presented, they were asked to generate an image that 
integrated the target word with the pegword. The free recall performance indicated that 
rote rehearsal condition produced similar levels of memory both in the presence and the 
absence of the irrelevant pictures. In contrast, the pegword mnemonic instructions 
produced better memory in the absence of irrelevant pictures than their presence.  This 
implies that disruption to visual working memory can disrupt memory effects reliant on 
imagistic encoding, a conclusion consistent with subsequent, more refined research.  
Quinn and McConnell (1996) criticized Logie’s (1986) demonstration, arguing 
that the irrelevant picture task might employ the central executive system as well as the 
visuo-spatial sketchpad, because meaningful pictures might attract more attention than 
random displays of meaningless stimuli.  They devised a technique called dynamic visual 
noise (DVN). DVN is a rectangular display, consisting of small black and white squares 
on a computer screen. The squares change randomly and continuously between black and 
white over the presentation period, very similar to the experience of viewing an out-of-
tune TV monitor. In their study, Quinn and McConnell used this rectangular dynamic 
visual noise display, changing randomly at a continuous on/off rate of 291 dots per 
second in order to see whether dynamic visual noise selectively disrupted visual working 
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memory, without invoking the central executive. As in Logie (1986), they assigned 
participants to two different memory instructions: rote rehearsal and visual mnemonic 
rehearsal conditions.  Moreover, participants in each condition were subjected to three 
different distractor conditions. In no distraction condition, participants looked at the 
blank screen while they were trying to learn the words. In irrelevant pictures condition, 
participants received a series of line drawings that changed every 5 seconds while they 
were trying to memorize the words. In the dynamic visual noise condition, the 
participants received the constantly changing dynamic visual noise display.  In all 
encoding conditions, participants were told to look at the screen and to ignore the 
displayed stimuli without closing their eyes. At test, they were asked to recall the words 
in the order that the list was presented, with the place number (e.g. one) serving as the 
cue word.  The researchers hypothesized that any type of visual distraction should 
diminish performance for participants assigned to visual mnemonic instructions more 
than participants assigned to rote rehearsal condition. Moreover, the dynamic visual noise 
should only impair performance in the visual mnemonic condition as it only interferes 
with the visuo-spatial sketchpad, whereas the irrelevant pictures should impair 
performance in both visual mnemonic and rote rehearsal conditions, as the changes in 
irrelevant pictures may draw on the central executive.  
The results yielded the expected results. First, there was a main effect of visual 
distraction, with no distractor leading to better memory performance than either distractor 
condition. Second and more critically, there was an interaction between memory 
instructions and the type of distractor.  In the rote condition, drawings interfered with rote 
rehearsal but visual noise did not, whereas in the visual mnemonic condition, both visual 
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noise and line drawings interfered with memory performance and did so to an equal 
degree (experiment 1). One counter argument that could be made against the findings is 
that visual mnemonic is more difficult than rote rehearsal; thus, any kind of secondary 
task will disrupt the visual mnemonic condition more than it does rote rehearsal, not 
because of the selective visual interference of the DVN, but because of the difficulty of 
the visual mnemonic. Thus, Quinn and McConnell also manipulated the modality of the 
distraction as follows:  1) visual presentation of word lists with irrelevant speech 
presented through the headphones 2) visual presentation of the lists with no irrelevant 
speech 3) verbal presentation of the lists while watching the dynamic visual noise on the 
monitor 4) verbal presentation of the lists while watching the blank screen (experiment 
3). They reasoned that if it is the difficulty of the visual mnemonic that leads to the 
decreased performance, all secondary tasks should lead to more impairment with the 
visual mnemonic condition than rote rehearsal. In contrast, if it is the selective visual 
disruption of DVN that leads to decreased memory performance, irrelevant speech, a 
verbal task which impairs verbal memory but leaves visual memory intact, should lead to 
more impairment in rote rehearsal condition than visual mnemonic condition.  As in 
Experiment 1, half of the participants received the visual mnemonic instructions, whereas 
the other half received rote rehearsal instructions. The results indicated that with visual 
mnemonic instructions, memory performance was only diminished in the dynamic visual 
noise condition compared to the three other conditions. In contrast, with rote rehearsal 
instructions, performance only decreased in the irrelevant speech condition. This provides 
further evidence that dynamic visual noise selectively interferes with the visual working 
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memory, and not with the verbal working memory (see also Andrade, Kemps, Werniers, 
May and Szmalec, 2002). 
 The effectiveness of the DVN paradigm has also been shown with experiments 
concerning the long-term retention of words. Parker and Dagnall (2009) examined the 
effect of DVN on the concreteness effect. The concreteness effect refers to the finding of 
superior memory for words that signify concrete objects such as desk, compared to words 
that signify abstract concepts such as justice. It has been hypothesized that the 
concreteness effects arise because the concrete objects are encoded in both verbal and 
imaginal systems and thus possess multiple retrieval routes. In contrast, abstract words 
can only be encoded verbally, leading to fewer retrieval routes (Paivio, 1971; 1991). 
Parker and Dagnall reasoned that if concrete words entail the processing of both visual 
and verbal information, then a distracting visual task should selectively interfere with the 
former processing and selectively reduce memory for concrete words. In the study phase 
of the experiment, participants heard abstract and concrete words while passively 
watching either a static visual noise display or a dynamic visual noise display. Static 
visual noise comprised of a large rectangular display with fixed random black and white 
dots on it. For the DVN, the display changed constantly with the condition that the 
proportion of the back to white dots within the display was maintained. The type of 
interference was manipulated between subjects, whereas the type of word was 
manipulated within. At retrieval, participants received a free recall test. The results 
yielded a significant interaction between word type and interference condition such that 
when participants were presented with the static noise field, the classical concreteness 
effect was obtained, with concrete words recalled more than abstract words. In contrast, 
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the effect was reversed in the dynamic visual noise condition, with abstract words being 
recalled more often than concrete words.  Moreover, the type of interference did not 
affect recall for abstract words, whereas it significantly decreased recall for concrete 
words (experiment 1). This finding was also replicated with a recognition test 
(Experiment 2). This finding is important for three reasons. First of all, this study shows 
that DVN can be successfully used in studies of long-term memory, especially when an 
encoding condition requires imaginal processes. Secondly, the maintenance of the 
memory performance for abstract words and the decline in the performance for concrete 
words in the dynamic visual noise condition indicates that DVN was able to selectively 
interfere with the imaginal codes, providing further support for the use of this distractor 
condition. Last of all, in the previous studies, participants were actually trained to use the 
visual mnemonics in learning the words. In this study, participants were not given any 
explicit instructions to use the imaginal processes. However, DVN was able to 
successfully reduce performance for imaginal processes even when participants were not 
given any explicit instructions to use them.  
 Another task that selectively interferes with the visual working memory is the 
spatial tapping task, where the participants are asked to repeatedly tap a certain sequence 
of keys in the shape of a figure. Spatial tapping has been repeatedly shown to disrupt 
visual working memory, but not verbal memory. For example, in a study Salway and 
Logie (1995) presented participants with primary tasks, which either employed verbal or 
visual processes. In the visual primary task, participants were given instructions to put 
certain letters to certain locations in a matrix by the sentence format, such as in the 
starting square put an A. In the next square to the right, put a B. In the verbal task, the 
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instructions were altered from directions to adjectives so that they did not indicate spatial 
locations so that participants could only memorize the verbal directions with no reference 
to spatial locations. An example for this is as follows: in the starting square put an A. In 
the next square to the slow, put a B. At test, participants were asked to recall the 
sentences verbally. For the secondary task, participants either had to perform spatial 
tapping or articulatory suppression. Recall in the visual primary task decreased with 
spatial tapping but not with articulatory suppression. Similarly, for the verbal primary 
task, performance decreased with articulatory suppression but not with spatial tapping. 
Moreover, research also shows that spatial tapping task is a more demanding task than 
DVN.   Andrade et al (2002) presented participants with static matrix patterns filled 
randomly with black and white squares to retain in short term memory. This pattern was 
either followed by DVN or spatial tapping in the retention period. The experiment 
showed that participants’ performance drops more in spatial tapping compared to DVN. 
Thus, spatial tapping differs from DVN in that it reduces performance more than DVN 
and it requires repeated responses from the participants.    
Use of Auditory Distractors in Working Memory 
One of the tasks that has been frequently used as a distractor for verbal working 
memory is irrelevant speech. In a first demonstration, Salame and Baddeley (1982) 
showed that presentation of irrelevant speech impairs serial recall of digits presented 
visually. In this experiment, participants tried to memorize sets of nine digits on each 
trial. They were exposed to three different distractor tasks: meaningful speech, white 
noise and silence. In the meaningful speech condition, participants listened to a set of 
prerecorded three letter words for each digit that they saw. In the white noise condition, 
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the distractor consisted of noise bursts during the presentation of the digits. The silence 
condition served as the control. In all conditions, participants were instructed to recall the 
digits in the original order immediately after the presentation of the last digit, while 
trying to ignore anything that they hear over the headphones. The irrelevant meaningful 
speech reduced serial recall performance relative to the white noise and silence 
conditions, whereas the latter two conditions did not differ (LeCompte, 1994). This effect 
has also been shown with auditory materials (e.g. Hanley & Broadbent, 1987). Using a 
dichotic listening paradigm, Hanley and Broadbent (1987) presented participants with 9 
single digits through one headphone for immediate serial recall, while irrelevant speech 
or silence was presented in the other headphone.  Serial recall was lower in the irrelevant 
speech condition. In a comparison of the of the effects of irrelevant speech on visual and 
auditory target lists, Jones, Macken and Nicholls (2004) asked participants to memorize 
lists of 7 digits that were either seen or heard. As the lists were presented, participants 
were exposed to a repeated token of syllables, changing token of syllables, or to silence. 
The experiment yielded two results: First, there was no recall difference between the 
auditory and visual presentation of the target lists. Second, the changing irrelevant 
syllables impaired recall compared to repeated syllables and silence, but the last two 
conditions did not differ from each other (see Hanley& Bakapoulou, 2003 for a similar 
result)   
The meaningfulness of the irrelevant speech affects recall performance as well. 
Oswald, Tremblay and Jones (2000) showed that the encoding of the visual verbal 
material was impaired more when participants heard meaningful irrelevant speech (e.g.  
an excerpt from the evening news) compared to meaningless irrelevant speech (e.g. 
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excerpt from evening news played backwards), which in turn impaired working memory 
compared to a quiet condition, a finding replicated in other studies (e.g. Bell, Buchner & 
Mund, 2008; Van Gerven, Meijer, Vermeeren, Vuurman & Jolles, 2007). This finding is 
in some ways similar to the findings in visual working memory. Just as irrelevant 
meaningful pictures impair recall more than DVN condition for tasks requiring the use of 
visual processes in working memory (Quinn & McConnell, 1996), meaningful speech 
impairs recall more than meaningless speech for tasks requiring the use of verbal 
processes in working memory. This might be indicative of greater central executive 
involvement in ignoring meaningful speech.   
Another critical issue to the current project is that even though irrelevant speech 
impairs verbal rehearsal processes, it does not impair basic comprehension of sentences. 
In a study about the effects of IS on reading comprehension, Boyle and Coltheart (1996) 
presented their participants with acceptable or unacceptable sentences that varied in 
complexity. Simple sentences contained a right-branching relative clause such as The 
applause pleased the woman that gave the speech, whereas the syntactically complex 
sentences included a center-embedded relative clause The hay that the farmer stored fed 
the hungry animal. The acceptability of the sentences was manipulated by using either 
homophones (e.g. The teacher taut the child that played the clarinet) or orthographic 
control words (e.g. The teacher tight the class that painted the poster). Participants’ task 
was to make a decision about whether the sentence was grammatically correct or not. 
While they were reading the sentences, participants heard background sound with a silent 
control condition and four noise conditions: (1) instrumental music, (2) singing with 
instrumental accompaniment, (3) unaccompanied singing, and (4) speech. The results 
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indicated that even though the complexity of sentences increased reading time and 
decreased decision accuracy, the background noise had no effect on comprehension of 
the sentences, because the reaction time to decision making was statistically insignificant, 
and the errors made in accepting or rejecting unacceptable sentences did not change 
across noise conditions.      
Thus, meaningless irrelevant speech appears to be a good candidate as a verbal 
distractor for a few reasons. First, the evidence indicates that irrelevant speech disrupts 
rehearsal of other verbal information. Baddeley (2003) argued that this is because speech 
has direct and automatic access to the phonological loop.  Moreover, even though 
irrelevant speech disrupts the recall of verbal information in working memory, it leaves 
the comprehension processes intact (Boyle & Coltheart, 1996). Furthermore, irrelevant 
speech has been confirmed as an effective verbal distractor task in previous studies, 
employing imagery. Both Logie (1986) and Quinn and McConnell (1996) showed that 
the recall with peg-word mnemonic instructions, which requires the use of visual aids, 
was unaffected by irrelevant speech, even though recall in rote rehearsal conditions was 
impaired by it. Last of all, theoretically it seems to be an equivalent verbal analogue for 
the dynamic visual noise display.  
Another candidate for a verbal distractor task is articulatory suppression (AS), the 
repeated articulation of a specific word or sound. A classical experiment by Richardson 
and Baddeley (1975) examined the effect of articulatory suppression on free recall. 
Participants were presented with lists of 16 words. For half of the lists, participants were 
asked to say “hi-ya” repeatedly as the words were presented on the computer screen. For 
the other half of the lists, participants remained silent. The results indicated that the free 
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recall of the lists was significantly impaired in the articulatory suppression condition, as 
compared to the silent condition. The study by Cocchini et al (2002), described earlier, 
provides further evidence that articulatory suppression impairs serial digit recall, a task 
known to employ verbal rehearsal, whereas it leaves visual pattern recall intact.  
One other important aspect of articulatory suppression is that even though it 
prevents verbal rehearsal, it does not impair comprehension. In a study, Calvo and 
Castillo (1995) investigated the effects of anxiety on reading comprehension when 
participants have to perform a concurrent working memory task. Relevant to the current 
study, in the low anxiety condition, participants were presented with a text in four 
different conditions: no interference, articulatory suppression, meaningful irrelevant 
speech and meaningless (reversed) speech. At test, participants had to answer true-false 
questions assessing comprehension of the text. Articulatory suppression and meaningless 
speech produced levels of comprehension equal to the no-interference condition (only 
meaningful speech decreased comprehension). This confirms that participants have no 
trouble comprehending text in the presence of meaningless speech or articulatory 
suppression.  
 The detrimental effect of articulatory suppression has also been shown with 
stories in long term memory retrieval. Christoffels (2006) found that participants listening 
to stories over the headphones while completing an AS task had lower delayed recall 
performance for the story than the participants who did not have to complete any 
concurrent tasks. Thus, articulatory suppression prevented the participants from 
rehearsing the story, leading to decreased recall performance, in a delayed free recall test. 
This finding shows that articulatory suppression can also be a good candidate as a task 
39 
 
that disrupts the verbal working memory performance for a few reasons. First, AS leads 
to decreased recall performance for verbal material relative to the silence condition. 
Secondly, even though it disrupts the memory for verbal material, it leaves the visual 
memory intact, as participants are still able to maintain their performance in tasks 
requiring visual memory, such as perceptuo-motor tracking tasks. Last of all, the 
impairment of articulatory suppression on free recall memory performance has also been 
shown with long-term retention.    
Current Study 
 Given the debate about the basis of the bizarreness effect, the goal of the current 
study is to determine whether the critical factor is imaginal processes or verbal rehearsal. 
The critical step is to find a method to disentangle the role of each process in obtaining 
the bizarreness effect (Worthen, 1997). Earlier studies have tried to achieve this by 
encouraging one type of processing more than the other. This has been done in different 
ways. Some researchers have used different instructions such as incidental vs. intentional 
instructions (Burns, 1996; Merry & Graham, 1978; Worthen & Roark, 2002), or imaginal 
vs. semantic elaboration instructions (Kroll & Tu, 1988; McDaniel & Einstein, 1986; 
Worthen, 1997). Other researchers have manipulated materials that depended either more 
or less on imaginal encoding, such as sentence presentation (McDaniel & Einstein, 1986), 
sentence generation from nouns (Cornoldi et al, 1988), or image presentation (Nappe & 
Wollen, 1972; Nicholas & Worthen, 2009; Worthen, 1997). Other research tried to find 
answers by looking for relationships between the bizarreness effect and other factors, 
such as imaging ability (Anderson & Buyer, 1994), plausibility (Imai & Richman, 1991) 
or complexity (Richman, 1994). Although a main goal in the previous research was to 
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parse out the effect of each element by encouraging one type of processing, the studies do 
not produce unambiguous results; as reviewed earlier, the studies do not necessarily rule 
out the alternative hypothesis, leading to an unresolved controversy.   
Perhaps a better way to disentangle the contribution of imaginal and verbal 
processes would be to impair one of the processes through the use of a secondary task 
and see if the bizarreness effect persists. There has been only one study that investigated 
the bizarreness effect with the use of a secondary task.  Worthen, Garcia-Rivas, Green 
and Vidos (2000) investigated how the reaction time to a secondary task changes during 
the comprehension of common and bizarre sentences.  However, this study is not 
particularly relevant because the secondary task was not designed to selectively disrupt 
one type of processing. Thus, the goal of the project is to identify which process is critical 
by impairing the verbal or imaginal components of working memory selectively, and 
seeing under what conditions the bizarreness effect is obtained.
 CHAPTER 2 
EXPERIMENT 1 
In the study phase of this experiment, participants were presented with bizarre and 
common sentences in a mixed-list design.  Two experimental groups also carried out a 
secondary task designed to occupy one of the slave systems of working memory, either a 
secondary task that occupies verbal working memory or a task that employs visual 
working memory. The control groups did not carry out a secondary task.   
The secondary tasks to be used in this experiment needed to fulfill several 
requirements in order for the tasks in different modalities to be equivalent. To begin with, 
both of the secondary tasks should impair only one of the slave systems, leaving the other 
system intact. Thus, the tasks chosen were shown by prior research to disrupt verbal 
working memory but not visual working memory, or vice versa.  In addition, the 
secondary tasks should have similar qualities in terms of the cognitive load, the 
meaningfulness and the continuity of the stimulus. For example, if the task in the visual 
domain is continuous and meaningless to the participants throughout the encoding of the 
sentences, the task in the verbal domain should also be continuous and meaningless. Last 
of all, both tasks should have similar instructions, and thus require similar types of 
responses from the participants. For example, if the secondary task for visual working 
memory requires the participants to look at the stimuli while trying to ignore it, the 
secondary task for verbal working memory should similarly require the participant to 
hear the stimuli while trying to ignore it.  
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As explained earlier, dynamic visual noise (DVN) is an ideal candidate as a 
secondary task to disrupt visual working memory for a few reasons. First, it impairs the 
visual working memory selectively, leaving verbal working memory intact. Moreover, 
because the dynamic visual display is meaningless, no response is required, and 
verbalization is minimal, the task requires minimal use of the central executive or the 
phonological loop. In addition, it has been successfully used in long-term memory 
experiments and has proven successful in disrupting imaginal processes for complex 
stimuli. 
For the distraction of verbal working memory, irrelevant speech (IS) is analogous 
to dynamic visual noise in many respects. Just like DVN, IS impairs the verbal working 
memory selectively and leaves the visual memory intact. IS has been successfully used to 
disrupt verbal elaboration and rehearsal. IS requires no response from the participant; 
they are instructed to passively listen to the stimuli and ignore it. Moreover, IS can be 
modified to be even more similar to DVN in other important respects, such as continuity 
and meaningfulness. Thus, if participants are presented with continuous speech in a 
language that they do not know (such as Turkish), the speech will still have the 
characteristics of speech, such as changing tokens of sound, intonation, articulation, etc., 
but will be meaningless to the participants; thus, the cognitive load of IS on the central 
executive and the visual sketchpad will be minimal, analogous to the visual distraction 
condition. Therefore, for the first experiment, DVN and IS served as the secondary tasks.  
During the study phase, participants were presented with the common and the 
bizarre sentences for a fixed period of time and asked to create a mental image for the 
sentence and then rate each image for its vividness. The vividness rating paired with 
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incidental-learning instructions has been found to maximize the bizarreness effect.  In the 
control condition of Experiment 1, we wanted to obtain the largest possible effect size to 
maximize our ability to detect interactions.  
Participants in the visual distraction condition listened to the bizarre and the 
common sentences over headphones while simultaneously watching DVN on the 
computer screen. They were told to look at the screen at all times. Similarly, participants 
in the verbal distraction condition were presented with the common and the bizarre 
sentences on the computer screen while they listened to the IS over the headphones.  In 
both cases, the study trial was followed by the vividness rating. Two separate control 
groups were presented with the sentences in either visual modality or auditory modality: 
The control group for the visual distraction group listened to bizarre and common 
sentences over the headphones, without exposure to DVN. The control group for the 
verbal distraction group saw the sentences on the computer screen without exposure to 
IS.  Based on prior research, there is no reason to think that the size of the bizarreness 
effect in the control condition should be impacted by modality of presentation. However, 
two control groups were necessitated by the need to present the sentences in different 
modalities in the two experimental conditions. 
Method 
Participants 
 Forty-eight undergraduates from the University of North Carolina participated in 
exchange for course credit. 
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Design and Materials 
The design was a 2 (sentence type: bizarre and common) x 4 (group: visual 
distraction, verbal distraction, visual distraction control, verbal distraction control) mixed 
design, with sentence type manipulated within subjects and group manipulated between 
subjects. The stimulus set consisted of 16 nouns triplets, each used to create one bizarre 
and one common sentence, taken from McDaniel and Einstein (1986), and producing a 
total of 32 sentences.  The bizarreness of the material was manipulated by presenting 
sentences that depict scenes which are either possible and unsurprising or impossible and 
surprising. For example, for the word triplet banker, newspaper, puddle, the common 
sentence was The banker dropped the newspaper in the puddle, whereas the bizarre 
sentence was The banker floated across the puddle on a newspaper. The thirty-two 
sentences, consisting of 16 bizarre and 16 common sentences, were further randomly 
divided into two mixed lists of 8 common and 8 bizarre sentences. These two lists were 
counterbalanced across subjects so that each noun triplet was presented in bizarre and 
common contexts equally often. For each list, two common sentences from the original 
McDaniel and Einstein (1986) were used as practice sentences (See Appendix. A for a 
complete list of materials used). For auditory presentation, each sentence was recorded to 
an audio-file in a neutral voice. For visual presentation, each sentence was shown on the 
computer screen.   
The irrelevant speech consisted of 10-s segments of a voice reading sentences 
from a story in Turkish.  The dynamic visual noise was based on the technique used in 
Quinn and McConnell (1996), and consisted of a large rectangular display covering 80% 
of the computer screen and consisting of small black and white squares. The squares 
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randomly either remained the same color or changed color (from black to white or vice 
versa) every .25 seconds with a probability of .5, giving the sense of a flickering 
rectangular display, with the ratio of the black and white squares maintained equal 
throughout the presentation.   
Procedure 
 Participants were told that the experiment was about individual differences in 
visual imagery in the face of distraction. They were told that they would read or listen to 
sentences while they tried to ignore a secondary stimulus that might be presented to them. 
Furthermore, they were instructed to create visual images of the sentences and rate the 
vividness of each image on a scale of 1 (not at all vivid) to 5 (very vivid). During the 
study phase, participants were presented with the common and the bizarre sentences in a 
random order, with the restriction that no more than two sentences of the same kind were 
presented consecutively. Keeping in line with McDaniel and Einstein (1986), participants 
were not informed about the nature of the sentences. Participants were given two practice 
trials with common sentences.  
In the visual distraction condition, the sentences were presented over the 
headphones. Each trial started with a short beep for half a second, immediately followed 
by the DVN display, which was presented for a total of 10 seconds. Two seconds after 
the DVN was initiated, the sentence was presented over the headphones. Participants 
were given 8 seconds to encode each sentence and create a mental image, followed by a 
screen asking them to rate the vividness of the image within 4 seconds. Once they rated 
the sentence, the program proceeded onto the next trial. The whole trial lasted up to14.5 
seconds. In this condition, participants were instructed to watch the dynamic visual noise 
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presented on the screen for the duration of encoding. Participants were told to look at the 
screen, without looking in any other direction. They were also told that the noise display 
is only presented to try to distract them from the sentence task. The experimenter 
monitored the participants’ gaze to ensure compliance with the instructions.  
 In the verbal distraction condition, the sentences were presented visually. Each 
trial started with a half-second beep, immediately followed by the irrelevant speech 
presented over the headphones. Two seconds after the initiation of IS, the sentence was 
presented on the screen for 8 seconds. Participants were then prompted by the screen to 
enter their vividness rating within 4 seconds, after which the next trial began. As in the 
visual distraction condition, each trial lasted for up to 14.5 seconds. In this condition, 
participants were told that the speech was only presented to try to distract them from the 
sentence task.  
 In the control conditions, the trial started with a beep and a blank screen. Two 
seconds later, the sentence was presented either visually (the verbal distraction control 
group) or aurally (the visual distraction control group). Eight seconds later, participants 
entered the vividness rating and then proceeded onto the next sentence. As in other 
conditions, each trial lasted up to 14.5 seconds.     
After the study phase, participants were asked to solve math problems for 3 
minutes in order to minimize recency effects (e.g. 67 + 46 =____).  The distractor task 
was followed by the testing phase.  Participants were asked to recall and write down as 
many sentences as they could remember from the encoding phase. They were also told 
that they should write any fragments, nouns or verbs that they might recall, even if they 
did not remember the whole sentence.  
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Results 
The use of concurrent WM tasks 
 Previous research has used a few different measures of recall, although the 
measures generally yield very similar results. We used the two most common measures: 
the total noun recall and the sentences access measure. The sentence access measure 
counts a sentence as accessed if at least one noun from the sentence has been recalled. 
The total noun recall refers to the proportion of nouns recalled. Both measures were 
computed separately for bizarre and common sentences (Table 1).  
 The primary analyses compared performance in the visual or verbal distraction 
groups, compared to their respective control groups. First, the verbal distraction group 
and its control group were compared. For this analysis, the dependent variables of total 
noun recall and sentence access were separately submitted to an ANOVA, with the item 
type (bizarre vs. common) as the within subjects variable and the distraction condition 
(verbal distraction vs. verbal distraction control) as the between subjects factor. First, the 
analyses of the access measure showed a significant effect of sentence type, with bizarre 
sentences accessed more often than common sentences (F(1,22) = 24.26, MSe = .026, 
p<.01). There was no significant effect of experimental condition (F(1,22) = 2.07, MSe = 
.023, p>.10, nor interaction (F<1).  The analysis of total noun recall produced identical 
results: a main effect of sentence type, F(1,22) = 14.81, MSe = .022, p<.01, and no effect 
of group or interaction (Fs<1).    
Before conducting the primary analyses for the visual distraction group, it was 
necessary to investigate whether the bizarreness effect emerged when the sentences were 
presented aurally, instead of visually as in the vast majority of bizarreness research.  An 
48 
 
analysis of the visual-distraction control group revealed no significant different between 
the bizarre and common condition for either the access measure (t(11) = .92, ns) or total 
noun recall (t (11) = .34, ns). Thus, the bizarreness effect was not found in the control 
condition using auditory presentation, a point to which I return in the discussion section. 
Even though the bizarreness effect was not obtained in the visual-distraction 
control group condition, the second a-priori ANOVA, in which the visual distraction 
group was compared to its control group, was conducted.  The access measure revealed a 
main effect for the sentence type (F(1,22) = 17.76, MSe = .021, p<.01), with bizarre 
sentences (M =.52 , SD=.18) accessed more often than common sentences (M =.34 , 
SD=.16).  There was no significant effect for experimental condition (F<1), but the 
interaction was significant (F(1,22) = 7.43, MSe = .021, p<.05), with bizarre items 
accessed more than common items in the visual distraction condition, and no difference 
between common and bizarre items in the control group. The proportion of total noun 
recall followed the identical pattern, with a significant main effect for sentence type 
(F(1,22) = 11.63, MSe = .017, p<.05), no effect of experimental condition (F<1, ns), and a 
significant interaction (F(1,22) = 8.23, MSe = .017, p<.01), with more nouns recalled 
from the bizarre sentences in the visual distraction condition but not in the control 
condition.  
Vividness ratings 
Vividness ratings were submitted to a 2 x 4 ANOVA, with sentence type as a 
within-subjects factor, and the experimental condition as the between subjects factor.  
The results yielded a main effect for the bizarreness such that the vividness ratings for 
common sentences (M= 3.96, SD = .83) were significantly higher than for bizarre 
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sentences (M= 3.01 SD =.89) (F(3,44) = 24.69, MSe = .87, p<.01).  Neither the effect of 
experimental group (F(322) = 1.54, MSe = .61, p>.05) nor the interaction reached 
significance (F<1).  
Discussion 
First, the bizarreness effect was replicated in the visual presentation mode. The 
participants who were presented with the sentences on the screen remembered more 
bizarre sentences than common sentences, regardless of whether they were in the verbal 
distraction group or the control group. Moreover, the size of the bizarreness effect did not 
differ across groups, indicating that the verbal distractor task did not modify the 
bizarreness effect. Irrelevant speech is an effective task in terms of selectively disrupting 
the phonological loop. Thus, the finding that the size of the bizarreness effect was not 
reduced by irrelevant speech shows that the bizarreness effect might not be associated 
with the verbal slave system.  
Secondly, the bizarreness effect was not obtained with auditory presentation in the 
control group. Even though there was a slight advantage for bizarre sentences over 
common sentences, the finding did not reach significance. Still, the comparison of the 
visual distraction group to its control group warrants consideration in terms of the 
original goal of the study. I had hypothesized that if the bizarreness effect depends on 
imaginal processes, there should be an interaction between these two factors such that the 
advantage for the bizarre sentences decreases or is eliminated in the visual distraction 
condition. When the DVN condition is compared to its control group, the findings do not 
show a reduction in the size of the bizarreness effect. On the contrary, the concurrent 
presentation of DVN along with the sentences produced a robust bizarreness effect, 
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significantly larger than in the control condition (and numerically larger than the other 
two groups). Thus, this experiment indicates that visual distraction does not decrease the 
bizarreness effect.  Thus, neither of the concurrent tasks, which are well known to disrupt 
one of the slave systems, selectively impaired the recall of bizarre sentences.  
The finding that the bizarreness effect is not obtained in auditory modality is 
interesting.  Most bizarreness studies have employed visual modality, and obtained the 
effect with an average of 12-16 participants in each condition. To my knowledge, there is 
only one published study that used auditory presentation of the sentences, and this study 
demonstrated a significant bizarre effect (Anderson & Buyer, 1994). However, Anderson 
and Buyer’s (1994) study used a group consisting of 80 participants.  Thus, the 
bizarreness effect that they obtained in the auditory modality might be associated with the 
number of participants that they used. The fact that there are no other published studies of 
bizarreness conducted in the auditory modality might be indicative of the possibility that 
this effect is not generally obtained in the auditory modality especially with smaller 
sample sizes. It is unclear why this might happen, but since the effect was not obtained in 
the control condition, the aural presentation of sentences was not used in the subsequent 
experiments. 
As an additional goal to the study, I investigated how the vividness ratings relate 
to sentence type and experimental condition. One of the most consistent findings in the 
literature is that the vividness ratings are always lower for the bizarre items as compared 
to the common items (e.g. Burns, 1996; McDaniel & Einstein, 1986; Robinson-Riegler & 
McDaniel, 1994). This has been explained in different ways: For example, Baddeley 
(2000) suggested that vividness depends on the amount of detail that can be represented 
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in working memory. Since the bizarre images are not very usual, the richness of 
representation in working memory is low, leading to lower ratings for the bizarre items. 
Similarly, Wollen and Margres (1987) suggested that imagination of bizarre sentences 
requires more transformations for the image as compared to common sentences, and the 
difficulty to transform the images also results in subjectively less vivid ratings of the 
images. Thus, one would expect that participants in the visual distraction condition 
should have more difficulty in general in terms of visualizing the image, especially if the 
bizarreness effect is moderated by the visual system.  I investigated whether the vividness 
of the images is quantified differently for common and bizarre sentences at encoding with 
respect to experimental condition. The results suggested that the vividness ratings for the 
bizarre images were lower than the common sentences, as expected from previous 
research. However, there was no main effect for the experimental group. One reason for 
this might be that since the experimental condition is a between subjects factor, 
participants have no chance to compare the distraction condition to no distraction 
condition; thus, they only take into account the ease of processing, relative to the other 
within subjects factor (sentence type). Even though it would be quite interesting to 
compare the ratings with the experimental condition as a within subjects variable, this 
idea is beyond the scope of this project.  Another possibility is that the bizarreness effect 
is not moderated by the visual slave system. Therefore, the experimental condition does 
not affect the feeling of vividness for the images.  
Some other analyses that investigate the relationship between vividness, memory 
accuracy, sentence type and experimental condition are also reported in the Appendix B.
2
                                                          
2
 Since the results are quite inconsistent across experiments, they are reported in the Appendix and 
discussed in the general discussion section. 
 CHAPTER 3 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 2 further investigates the bizarreness effect using alternate secondary 
tasks to disrupt visuo-spatial processing, on the one hand, and verbal rehearsal processes, 
on the other.  Although the secondary tasks of Experiment 1 were defensible starting 
points for the present investigation, the failure to obtain the bizarreness effect in the 
control condition for the visual distraction condition requires that the sentences be 
presented in the visual modality. Moreover, the failure to obtain any kind of impairment 
in the verbal task suggests that we should use tasks requiring more active involvement 
from the participants, instead of the passive listening of IS or the passive viewing of 
DVN.  
As well as increasing the workload on participants, there are some additional 
questions to be answered by the current experiment. In terms of visuo-spatial working 
memory, it is important to investigate the effect of spatial processes in the bizarreness 
effect. In the original working memory model, the visuo-spatial sketchpad supports both 
visual and spatial processing. However, there has been some debate about their 
separability. For example, Baddeley (2003) made a distinction between visual and spatial 
processes that take place in the visuo-spatial sketchpad. Alternatively, Salway and Logie 
(1995) found that performance on an imagery task was decreased to the same degree by a 
secondary task requiring spatial processing as by a visual secondary task. Thus, this study 
53 
 
used an alternate secondary task, spatial tapping, which is hypothesized to impair the 
spatial aspects of working memory.  
With regard to the verbal secondary task, an issue that needs further attention is 
the verbal storage versus verbal rehearsal of the sentences. To explain, verbal-WM is 
hypothesized to have two components: the phonological store, which retains 
phonological representations of verbal material in a short-lived phonological store, and 
the articulatory rehearsal process, which serves to reactivate and maintain phonological 
representations (Baddeley, 2003). IS is hypothesized to disrupt the storage of the verbal 
material, whereas articulatory suppression disrupts active rehearsal. Since IS did not 
impact the bizarreness effect in Experiment 1, it is necessary to determine if active 
rehearsal processes rather than passive storage of verbal information moderates the 
bizarreness effect. Hence, an articulatory suppression (AS) task is used in Experiment 2.  
As described in the introduction, AS is a good task for disrupting verbal rehearsal 
selectively, without affecting visual working memory. Similarly, spatial tapping is a good 
task for selectively disrupting spatial processing. Spatial tapping can be considered 
analogous to articulatory suppression in important ways. First, both tasks selectively 
impair the verbal or visual domain. Second, both tasks require active, repetitive responses 
from the participants. Moreover, by using tasks that require responses, participants’ 
cognitive load is increased which might produce more challenges than tasks that do not 
require responses, such as IS or DVN.   
As in experiment 1, participants in all groups were presented with common and 
bizarre sentences. Only visual presentation of the sentences was employed, as auditory 
presentation in the control condition of Experiment 1 did not produce the bizarreness 
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effect. Participants in the verbal-distraction condition were asked to count from 1 to 4 in a 
repetitive fashion during the presentation of the sentences. Participants in the visuospatial 
distraction condition were asked to tap pegs on a tapping board repetitively. As in 
Experiment 1, it was hypothesized that if the bizarreness effect is a consequence of 
spatial-imaginal processes, the superior performance for bizarre sentences should be 
reduced or eliminated in the visuo-spatial distraction condition and stay intact in AS 
condition. On the contrary, if the bizarreness effect is a consequence of verbal rehearsal 
processes, the superior performance for bizarre sentences should be eliminated or 
diminished by the AS task and remain intact for the spatial tapping task.       
Method 
Participants 
 Ninety participants from the University of North Carolina participated in the 
experiment for exchange for course credit or $10.  
Design and Materials 
Sentence type (bizarre vs. common) was manipulated within subjects and 
secondary task (articulatory suppression, spatial tapping, and control) was manipulated 
between subjects. The sentence materials of Experiment 1 were used. The spatial tapping 
board consisted of four wooden cubes (2.5 cm on a side), arranged 14 cm apart in a 
diamond shape on a square wooden board. This was modeled on the procedure of Smyth, 
Pearson, and Pendleton (1988). In order to make sure that the participants tapped the keys 
or counted rhythmically, audiofiles with the metronome beat of 120 times a minute (2 per 
second) were recorded.  
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Procedure 
  The study phase was the same as Experiment 1 with the exception of the change 
in the secondary tasks. The visuospatial distraction condition made use of spatial tapping.  
Each trial started with a beep for half a second, followed by the metronome beat over the 
headphones. The participants were instructed to tap the four pegs on the board 
repetitively, following a diamond shape pattern, with each tap corresponding to a single 
beat of the metronome.  In order to ensure that the participants did not look at the board, a 
separate board was placed between the computer screen and the tapping board to block 
the view of the tapping board. The participant could reach around the occluding board 
and comfortably carry out the tapping task. Two seconds after the beep sound, the 
sentence was presented on the screen for the duration of 8 seconds.  As in Experiment 1, 
the participant was instructed to read the sentence and create a mental image within this 
time duration. Next, the vividness rating was displayed on the screen, requiring a 
response within 4 seconds, yielding a trial lasting up to 14.5 seconds.    
 The verbal distraction condition made use of a standard articulatory suppression 
task in which participants were instructed to count aloud from 1 to 4 repetitively (ONE-
TWO-THREE-FOUR-ONE-TWO…) as they read the sentences (Macken & Jones, 1995, 
Toppino & Pisegna, 2005). Each trial started with a beep followed by the metronome beat 
over the headphones, signaling the participants to start articulating. Two seconds later, 
the sentence was presented on the computer screen for 8 seconds while the participant 
continued to count aloud to the metronome beat. Then, the participants provided the 
vividness rating within 4 seconds.  For both distraction conditions, the participants 
practiced the distractor task by itself prior to the presentation of the main study trials for 
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30 seconds, and were given feedback. Then, they had two practice trials with two 
common sentences to assure that the participant understood the procedure fully.  
The control condition was identical to the control condition of Experiment 1, 
except for the beat of the metronome over the headphones. The distractor and testing 
phases were the same as Experiment 1.  
Results 
The use of concurrent WM tasks 
 The sentence access and the proportion of total noun recall were separately 
calculated for common and bizarre sentences for both the experimental groups and the 
control group (Table 2).  
Table 2 
The access and total noun recall were separately submitted to a 2 x 3 ANOVA, 
with sentence type as a within subjects factor and the experimental condition as a 
between subjects factor. The access measure revealed a main effect for the sentence type 
(F(1,87) = 51.60, MSe = .021, p<.01), with the bizarre sentences accessed (M =.45 , 
SD=.18) more often than common sentences (M =.30 , SD=.16). Neither the main effect 
of experimental condition nor the interaction reached significance (Fs < 2). The identical 
pattern was obtained for total nouns recalled. The proportion recalled for the bizarre 
items (M =.36, SD=.17) was significantly higher compared to common items (M =.25 , 
SD=.14), (F(1,87) = 39.25, MSe = .015, p <.01). Neither the experimental condition nor 
its interaction with the sentence type was significant (Fs < 2). 
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Vividness ratings 
Vividness ratings were submitted to a 2 (sentence type) x 3 (experimental group) 
ANOVA. The results yielded a main effect of sentence type, with common sentences 
rated more vividly than bizarre sentences (F(1,87) = 118.06, MSe = .33, p <.01). There 
was no main effect of experimental condition (F(1,87) = 2.109, MSe = .1.054, p >.10), but 
the interaction was significant (F(2,87) = 3.34, MSe = .33, p <.05). Post-hoc analyses 
revealed no difference in vividness ratings of the common items across experimental 
condition (F<1). However, participants in the control condition rated the bizarre items as 
less vivid than the other two experimental groups (F(2,87) = 4.22, MSe = .77, p <.05). 
Discussion 
As in the previous experiment, there was a significant advantage for the bizarre 
sentences compared to common sentences. Thus, the bizarreness effect was replicated in 
the control condition. There was no main effect of experimental group and no interaction 
between sentence type and experimental group. This indicates that neither articulatory 
suppression nor irrelevant speech impaired the encoding of the sentences. Articulatory 
suppression is a task well known to selectively impair verbal working memory and 
articulatory rehearsal processes (e.g. Cocchini et al, 2002; Richardson and Baddeley, 
1975) and has successfully produced long term memory impairment as well (Christoffels, 
2006). For this reason, the fact that the AS did not reduce the size of the bizarreness 
effect puts into question the role of phonological loop and verbal rehearsal processes in 
the emergence of the bizarreness effect. Similarly, spatial tapping has been documented 
to selectively disrupt visuospatial processing and cause decrements in imaginal 
processing (e.g. Salway & Logie, 1995). Considering that there was no decrement in the 
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size of the superiority for the bizarre sentences, the role of visuo-spatial processes in the 
emergence of the bizarreness effect should also be questioned. Taken together, 
Experiments 1 and 2 have shown that concurrent working memory tasks which are well 
known to selectively impair one of the slave systems have no impact on the bizarreness 
effect.     
 The analyses pertaining to participants’ vividness ratings replicated Experiment 
1, revealing lower vividness ratings for the bizarre sentences as compared to common 
sentences. In addition that even though there was no statistically significant difference in 
the memory performance for the control group and the working memory groups for the 
bizarre sentences, participants in the control group rated the bizarre items as less vivid 
than the other working memory conditions. Thus, the presence of concurrent memory 
tasks may actually have caused the participants to experience the vividness of the 
sentences differentially. However, this difference in the subjective vividness rating is not 
necessarily predictive of the recall, at least for the bizarre sentences, given that the size of 
the bizarreness effect is not affected by the experimental condition.  
  
 CHAPTER 4 
EXPERIMENT 3 
The first two experiments investigated the effect of secondary working memory 
tasks, specifically designed to impair one of the slave systems and leave the other one 
intact. These experiments made use of standard distractor tasks known to selectively 
impair either visual-spatial WM (the DVN and spatial tapping tasks) or verbal WM (the 
IS and AS tasks). However, not only did these distractors not impact the bizarreness 
effect, none produced any significant impairment to memory performance at all. The 
previous experiments may not have impaired the encoding of the sentences because the 
secondary tasks were either passive or very repetitive. Perhaps the bizarreness effect only 
reduces in size with concurrent tasks which have an active maintenance component 
throughout the processing of the sentences, which change at each trial. For this reason, 
experiment 3 and 4 used concurrent working memory tasks that require active 
maintenance of either verbal or visuospatial information.   
Experiment 3 further assessed the imaginal account of bizarreness effect. The 
experimental group carried out a secondary task designed to occupy visual working 
memory, which required the maintenance of a visual pattern while generating images for 
bizarre and common sentences. Participants were presented with an image which they 
had to maintain while they encoded the sentence, followed by another image, which they 
judged to be the same or different from the first image.  The participants in the control 
group were exposed to the same images but were not asked to maintain or compare the 
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images.  This design was modeled after Della Sala, Gray, Baddeley, Allamano and 
Wilson’s (1999) visual span test. In this test, participants were provided with a 
checkerboard pattern for 3 seconds, consisting of randomly-placed black and white 
squares in a grid (which varied in size from 2 x 2 to 5 x 6). A blank grid of the same 
dimensions was then presented and participants tried to reproduce the pattern by filling in 
the black squares. This task was modified for the current experiment in a few ways.  
First, the memory for the grids was tested through a recognition test rather than a recall 
test, since filling in squares in a recall test would take more time than desired and cause 
disruptions in the flow of the procedures. Moreover, the visual span test was given after 
an 8-second delay (rather than immediately), with a sentence inserted between encoding 
of the visual grid and recognition. In this experiment, only 5x6 grids were used to 
maximize the employment of visual working memory capacity.      
This design differed from Experiment 1 and 2 in a few ways. To begin with, this 
experiment had an active maintenance component, which changed on each trial. Thus, the 
responses that the participants provided could not be automatized throughout the study. 
Moreover, participants were tested on how well they maintained the image in the 
distractor task. This provides two advantages. First, participants had to make a response 
in the visual distraction condition after they rated the sentences, which assured that there 
was little extra time to think about the sentences after the ratings. Secondly, since 
participants were tested on each trial for their maintenance of the visual pattern, it was 
possible to determine whether the successful maintenance of the visual image actually 
reduced the memory performance for bizarre and common sentences on a trial-by-trial 
basis.   
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Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two participants participated in exchange for course credit or monetary 
compensation.   
Materials and design: 
Sentence type (bizarre vs. common) was manipulated within subjects and task 
(visual vs. control) was manipulated between subjects. The sentence stimuli were the 
same as in the previous experiments. The material for the visual part of the test consisted 
of checkerboard patterns which are difficult to code verbally, adapted from Della Sala et 
al. (1999). A black and white visual pattern was created by randomly filling in half of the 
squares in a grid of 5x6. Eighteen patterns were prepared (2 for practice trials and 16 for 
experimental trials), along with a modified version of each in which one of the black and 
white squares were switched, making the shape slightly different than the original one. 
Procedure 
 Each trial began with a half-second beep followed by a visual matrix for four 
seconds. This was followed by a sentence for eight seconds, the vividness rating for up to 
4 seconds, and another visual pattern for 4 seconds.  The second pattern was either the 
same as the original or the altered version. Half of the patterns were the same and half 
different. Each trial lasted up to 20.5 seconds.  Participants in the visual distraction group 
were told to keep the matrix in mind while reading the sentence and creating a mental 
image of the sentence. They were told that they would see another visual matrix after the 
vividness rating task and this matrix might be the exactly the same as the first matrix or it 
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might be slightly different. Participants were told to press “s” for same or “d” for 
different.  
 The participants in the control group were told that they would see a visual 
matrix, which they should look at carefully, followed by the sentence and vividness 
rating task. In addition, they were told that they would see another matrix right after the 
rating task and that they should look at it carefully as well. Participants were not told 
anything about the similarity or difference between the patterns presented before and 
after the sentences.  In both the control and experimental groups, participants were given 
two practice trials to get them used to the procedure. The distractor and test phases were 
the same as Experiments 1 and 2.  
Results 
Concurrent WM tasks 
The descriptive statistics for the access measure and the total noun recall for 
Experiment 3 are presented in Table 3.  
The dependent variables of access and total noun recall were separately submitted 
to 2 (sentence type: bizarre vs. common) x 2 (experimental condition: visual distraction 
vs. control) ANOVAs.  The analysis for the access measure indicated a main effect of 
sentence type (F(1,30) = 17.73, MSe = .020, p<.01), with the bizarre sentences (M =.38 , 
SD=.19) accessed more often than common sentences (M =.24 , SD=.14). Furthermore, 
there was a main effect for the experimental condition (F(1,30) = 5.62, MSe = .029, 
p<.05), with more sentences accessed in the control condition (M =.36 , SD=.17) than in 
the visual distraction condition (M =.26 , SD=.14).  The interaction was not significant 
(F<1). The same pattern was replicated for the total noun recall: A significant main effect 
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for sentence type (F(1,30) = 10.88, MSe = .017, p<.01), with higher total noun recall in 
bizarre sentences (M =.30 , SD=.19) than the common sentences (M =.19 , SD=.14); a 
significant main effect for the experimental condition ((F(1,30) = 8.48, MSe = .028, 
p<.01), with lower total noun recall in the visual distraction condition (M =.30 , SD=.18), 
than control condition (M =.18 , SD=.12), and no interaction (F<1). 
The test of the visual distraction requires that participants are performing the 
distractor task as they are processing the sentences. The mean correct completion rate for 
the distractor task was .75, significantly above the chance level of .50 (t(15)= 8.11, d = 
.25, p<.01). Moreover, a paired samples t-test showed that participants’ successful 
completion of the distractor task was not different for bizarre (M =.76 , SD=.18) and 
common (M =.74 , SD=.14) sentences (t(15)= .43, d = .02, p>.5). A conditionalized 
analysis of the recall data was also conducted in which only the trials with correct 
answers on the visual working memory task were analyzed (see Table 3 for descriptives). 
Each sentence on the recall sheet was evaluated to determine if the participant completed 
the visual working memory task for the specified trial accurately. Sentences from 
inaccurate trials were excluded. Thus, the conditionalized analysis is limited to trials for 
which we have evidence that the participant is doing the concurrent task. Moreover, 
because the participants are only doing the task in the distraction condition, the control 
condition scores for the conditionalized analysis remain unchanged. The conditional 
results showed the exact same pattern as the non-conditional scores. For the conditional 
access measure, the effect of sentence type was significant (F(1,30) = 10.98, MSe = .027, 
p<.01), with greater access for bizarre than common sentences, as was the effect of 
experimental condition (F(1,30) = 10.03, MSe = .025, p<.01), with lower access in the 
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visual experimental condition. The interaction was not significant (F<1). The conditional 
total noun recall revealed the identical pattern: A significant main effect for the sentence 
type (F(1,30) = 6.76, MSe = .020, p<.01), a significant effect for the experimental 
condition (F(1,30) = 10.53, MSe = .026, p<.01), and no interaction (F<2).   
Vividness ratings 
The vividness ratings were submitted to a two-way ANOVA with the sentence 
type and the experimental condition as factors. The data yielded a main effect for the 
sentence type (F(1,29) = 24.36, MSe = .59, p<.01), with common sentences (M = 3.97, 
SD=.80) producing higher vividness ratings than bizarre sentences (M = 3.00, SD= .98). 
All the other effects were non-significant (Fs<1).   
Discussion 
Experiment 3 investigated the effect of a visual concurrent task, which contained 
an active maintenance component, on the bizarreness effect.  The experiment yielded 
higher memory performance for bizarre sentences, as compared to common sentences. 
Moreover, experimental condition had an effect on memory performance, with lower 
performance under visual distraction. Thus, the encoding of the sentences was impaired 
in general with the visual patterns test as a concurrent task. However, the interaction was 
not significant, indicating that the size of the bizarreness effect was not moderated by a 
visual task. The visual patterns task reliably occupies visual working memory, and 
correlates with many other measures of visual working memory (Della Sala et al, 1999). 
Even though this visual distractor task with active maintenance component disrupted 
overall memory performance, it did so proportionally for common and bizarre items. 
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Along with the results of Experiments 1 and 2, the present results provide no evidence 
that the visuospatial sketchpad is involved in the bizarreness effect.   
As an additional motivation, the vividness ratings were analyzed. Thus, even 
though the vividness ratings for the bizarre items were lower than the common items, the 
rating difference was similar on both the visual distraction condition and the control 
condition. This analysis replicates Experiment 1. The finding that vividness ratings do not 
change in experimental and control conditions might be a consequence of the between 
subjects design for the experimental condition: Participants only depend on the contrast 
of the bizarre and common items as a basis, and not on the visual cues. The vividness 
ratings are similar in both experimental groups, even though the performance in 
experimental condition is lower. This provides further proof that vividness ratings are 
unrelated to memory performance. 
   
 CHAPTER 5 
EXPERIMENT 4 
 The previous experiment assessed the visual encoding account of the bizarreness 
effect, with a concurrent task that required participants to maintain a visual matrix in 
mind while processing common and bizarre sentences. Even though the visual task led to 
a general decrement in memory performance, the size of the bizarreness effect was not 
moderated by the concurrent visual task, providing further evidence against a role for the 
visual sketchpad as a mechanism in the emergence of the bizarreness effect. The goal of 
the current experiment was to see whether a concurrent verbal task, which contained an 
active maintenance component eliminated or reduced the size of the bizarreness effect in 
order to more fully test the verbal rehearsal account. The design of the experiment was 
similar to experiment 3, with the exception that the concurrent task was designed to 
predominantly employ verbal rather than visual working memory. This is an important 
because the previous verbal tasks had no active maintenance component. Irrelevant 
speech required no responses or maintenance from the participants. Articulatory 
suppression required repetitive responses from the participants but no maintenance.  The 
responses in this task are quite routinized and may not tax verbal rehearsal processes 
sufficiently. In contrast, this experiment required the participants to actively keep in mind 
an array of verbal items which change on each trial. During the experiment, participants 
listened to a string of five letters over the headphones, followed by the sentence and 
vividness rating, followed by the presentation of a single letter. Participants in the verbal 
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distraction group were told to rehearse the letters while they read the sentences, and then 
to indicate whether the single letter was in the set, whereas control participants simply 
ignored the extraneous letters.  
Method 
Participants 
24 participants, from the University of North Carolina, participated in the 
experiment in exchange for course credit.  
Materials and design 
 The design was a 2 (sentence type: bizarre vs. common) x 2 (distraction: verbal 
vs. control), with sentence type manipulated within subjects and the verbal working 
memory task manipulated between subjects.  The sentence material was identical to the 
previous experiments. For the verbal distraction task, 18 five-consonant strings were 
assembled. Each letter was used at most five times across strings, and letters never 
repeated within a string. For half of the trials, one of the letters in the string was 
randomly selected as the prompt letter; on the other half of the trials, the prompt was not 
a letter from the string. Each letter was presented as a prompt no more than once. 
Moreover, the type of response for the letter prompt (yes v. no) was counterbalanced 
across subjects.  The consonants were recorded individually and presented over 
headphones.  
Procedure 
Each trial began with a beep for half a second, followed by 5 letters presented 
over the headphones, each for 800 milliseconds, summing to a duration of 4 seconds. The 
presentation of letters over the headphones was followed by the presentation of a bizarre 
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or a common sentence on the computer screen for 8 seconds. This was followed by the 
vividness ratings, up to 4 seconds. After entering the rating, the screen went blank and 
participants heard a letter over the headphones. Each trial lasted up to a total of 20.5 
seconds, as in experiment 3.  
Participants in the verbal distraction group were told to rehearse the letters silently 
to themselves as they read the sentence, create a mental image for it, and provide the 
vividness rating. They were further told to determine whether the final letter was one of 
the letters that preceded the sentence, pressing “y” for yes, and “n” for no.  Participants in 
the control condition were simply told to listen to the letters, but make no response.  
Otherwise, the participants carried out the trials as in the verbal distraction group.  
Participants in both groups were given 2 practice trials, followed by 16 experimental 
trials.  
 The distractor and test phases were the same as earlier experiments.  
Results 
Concurrent WM task 
The descriptive statistics for Experiment 4 are presented in Table 4. 
 First, the access measure was submitted to a 2 (sentence type: bizarre and 
common) x 2 (experimental condition: verbal vs. control) ANOVA.  The bizarreness 
effect emerged in this experiment (F(1,22) = 11.41, MSe = .024, p<.01), with bizarre 
sentences (M = .41, SD = .13) accessed more often than common sentences (M = .25, SD 
= .16). The main effect of the experimental condition was also significant (F(1,22) = 
5.64, MSe = .017, p<.05), with greater access in the control condition (M = .38, SD = .15) 
than the verbal distraction condition (M = .29, SD = .14). The interaction was not 
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significant (F<1). The total noun recall produced the same results as the access measure: 
a main effect for sentence type (F(1,22) = 9.88 , MSe = .018, p <.01), with more recall of 
nouns from bizarre (M = .32, SD = .14) than common sentences (M = .20, SD = .14); a 
main effect of experimental condition, (F(1,22) = 9.83 , MSe = .017, p <.01), with 
reduced recall in the verbal distraction (M = .20, SD = .11) compared to the control 
condition (M = .32, SD = .15); and no interaction (F<1).  
The mean correct completion proportion for the verbal distractor task was .87 
with a standard deviation of .16, significantly above chance (t(11)= 7.84, d = .37, p<.01). 
Moreover, successful completion of the distractor task was not different in bizarre (M 
=.87 , SD=.19) and common (M =.88, SD=.17) sentence conditions (t(11)= .23, d = .01, 
p>.8). An analysis of the conditional memory performance for access yielded the same 
results as the unconditionalized access scores, a main effect of sentence type, (F(1,22) = 
9.53, MSe= .022, p<.01), a main effect of experimental condition, (F(1,22) = 4.74, MSe= 
.020, p<.05), and no interaction (F<1). The conditional total noun recall yielded the 
identical pattern: a main effect for sentence type (F(1,22) = 8.11 , MSe = .018, p <.01), a 
main effect for the experimental condition (F(1,22) = 9.83 , MSe= .017, p <.01),  and no 
interaction (F<1). 
An additional pooled analysis of Experiment 3 and Experiment 4 to test a non-
selective distraction account of the bizarreness effect. A reduction in the bizarreness 
effect in this merged dataset would show that bizarreness effect might be responsive to 
just distraction in the slave systems, regardless of whether it is visual or verbal.  In order 
to test this, the datasets of Experiment 3 and 4 were merged, and the visual and verbal 
distraction conditions were coded as distraction, and the verbal control and visual control 
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conditions were coded as control. Then, access and total noun recall measures were 
submitted to a 2 (sentence type: bizarre vs. common) x 2 (experimental condition: 
distraction vs. control) ANOVA. For the access measure, there was a main effect for 
sentence type (F(1,54) = 30.07, MSe= .021, p<.01), a main effect for experimental 
condition (F(1,54) = 11.07, MSe= .023, p<.01), and no interaction (F<1). The total noun 
recall followed the identical pattern: a main effect for the sentence type (F(1,54) = 21.50, 
MSe= .017, p<.01), a main effect for the experimental condition (F(1,54) = 17.72, MSe= 
.023, p<.01) and no interaction (F<1).   
Vividness ratings 
 Vividness ratings were submitted to a 2 (sentence type) by 2 (experimental 
condition) ANOVA. The only effect that reached significance was the sentence type 
(F(1,22) = 32.03, MSe = .479, p <.01). Participants rated the common items (M = 4.42, 
SD = .54) as more vivid than the bizarre items (M = 3.30, SD = 1.06). The main effect of 
experimental condition was not significant (F(1,22) = 2.45, MSe = .88, p>.05) nor was the 
interaction (F(1,22) = 1.94, MSe = .48, p>.05).  
Discussion 
In this experiment, we further investigated the verbal rehearsal account of the 
bizarreness effect. The experiment was done to determine if verbal WM distraction 
involving active maintenance reduced the BE.  It does not, to add to the list of other 
aspects of verbal WM which do not reduce the effect. The previous distractor tasks, in 
which participants either passively listened to irrelevant speech or counted from one to 
four repeatedly, might not have occupied the phonological loop sufficiently to produce 
any decrement in the performance. However, even when the distractor task was ‘strong’ 
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enough to reduce general memory performance, the size of the bizarreness effect stayed 
the same, providing additional evidence that the phonological loop is not involved in the 
emergence of the bizarreness effect. The conditional analyses revealed that even when we 
excluded the trials in which participants did not pay full attention to the verbal distraction 
task (in which case they might have paid more attention to the sentences themselves), the 
size of the bizarreness effect remained the same. 
Furthermore, the pooled analyses of Experiment 3 and 4 tested a non-selective 
distraction account of the bizarreness effect. A possible reduction that might emerge in 
this analysis could support the idea that the central executive might be involved in the 
emergence of the bizarreness effect, since the common denominator in both experiments 
would be related to the taxing of the central executive more in the distractor tasks, as the 
experiments led to a general decrement in memory performance. Yet, the results did not 
point to any reduction in the bizarreness effect, providing no proof that a non-selective 
distraction account disrupted the bizarreness effect.    
As in the previous experiments, the analyses pertaining to the vividness ratings 
revealed that common sentences had higher vividness ratings than bizarre sentences. 
However, the difference between common and bizarre sentences was not altered by the 
experimental condition. This provides further proof that the vividness ratings are only 
moderated by within-subject variables, and the existence of verbal distractors do not 
change the subjective experience of how participants perceive the vividness of the bizarre 
or common sentences. The fact that the vividness ratings are not lower as a function of 
memory performance in control and verbal groups might also show that vividness ratings 
are unrelated to memory performance.
  
CHAPTER 6 
EXPERIMENT 5 
The previous experiments tried to disentangle the processes that contribute to the 
bizarreness effect by using distractor tasks to selectively impair verbal and visual 
processes in working memory. In experiments 1-4, I wished to maximize the bizarreness 
effect in the control condition to have a greater chance of finding interactions with the 
distractor condition, if one could be found.  The prior research indicated that the 
vividness rating instructions would do so. The results of these experiments indicated that 
neither type of concurrent working memory task impaired the superior memory for 
bizarre items. During the proposal, I had proposed follow up experiments that do not 
explicitly require image formation as the vividness ratings do.  
The following experiments were conducted to determine whether visual and 
verbal distractor tasks would reduce the size of the bizarreness effect when the encoding 
instructions do not focus on image generation. Two different types of instructions were 
used, intentional memory instructions (Experiment 5) and plausibility ratings 
(Experiments 6 and 7). In Experiment 5, participants were instructed to intentionally 
remember the sentences for a later memory test, and to provide memorability ratings. 
Intentional memory instructions are thought to encourage semantic encoding: When 
participants are told that they need to remember the sentences, they are more inclined to 
use semantic rehearsal processes, which are closer to verbal processes than the visual 
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processes (Burns, 1996; Hirshman et al, 1989). The literature on the use of intentional 
memory instructions in the bizarreness effect has yielded inconsistent results. Some 
research has found the bizarreness effect with intentional memory instructions (e.g. 
Worthen & Roark, 2002), and some research failed to obtain superiority for the bizarre 
sentences (Burns, 1996). For this reason, it was important to determine if the BE occurred 
with our materials and procedures, under intentional learning instructions. Consequently, 
only the control condition was carried out initially.  
As an additional motivation, I am interested in the beliefs of participants in terms 
of the memorability of the sentences. The main question is whether participants 
distinguish between common and bizarre sentences in terms of their memorability and 
whether this initial judgment at encoding is correlated with the accuracy of the sentences 
at retrieval.  
Method 
Participants 
22 participants, from the University of North Carolina, participated in the 
experiment in exchange for course credit.  
Design and Procedure 
Sentence type (bizarre vs. common) was manipulated within subjects. The study 
phase was the same as the verbal control condition of Experiment 1, with the exception of 
changes in the instructions and the type of rating. Participants in this experiment were 
told that they would be presented with sentences which they should try to remember for a 
later (unspecified) test. They were also asked to rate each sentence for its memorability 
on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating that the sentence is not memorable at all and 5 
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indicating that the sentence is very memorable. Each trial started with a beep. Two 
seconds later, participants were presented with the sentence on the screen for 8 seconds. 
This was followed by a screen on which the words “Memorability (1-5):” were displayed. 
The screen was displayed until the participants entered a number, up to 4 seconds. Each 
trial lasted up to 14.5 seconds.  The distractor and testing phases were identical to the 
previous experiments.  
Results 
Memory Accuracy 
 The descriptives for access, total noun recall and memorability ratings are 
presented in Table.5.  
There was no significant difference in access to bizarre and common sentences 
(t(21)=.56, ns). Likewise, the total noun recall was not significantly different for bizarre 
and common sentences (t(21)=1.54, ns).   
Memorability ratings  
Memorability ratings were significantly lower for bizarre than common sentences 
(t(21) = 2.39, p <.05). Moreover, participants’ memorability ratings were averaged over 
accuracy and sentence type and were submitted to a paired samples t-test separately for 
bizarre and common sentences. The result revealed that the memorability ratings did not 
predict accuracy for bizarre sentences (t(21) = .730, ns) or common sentences (t(21) = 
1.55, ns).    
Discussion 
The intentional memory instructions eliminated the bizarreness effect for both 
recall measures. Because the bizarreness effect did not emerge in the control condition, 
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the concurrent working memory task conditions were not run. As the instructions change 
from incidental to intentional instructions, the memorial advantage for bizarre items over 
common items was wiped out completely. When participants are given incidental 
instructions, they do not take any initiation for what they will memorize; thus, bizarre 
items might attract more attention naturally, leading to more elaborative rehearsal than 
common items. Yet, when they are told that they will have to remember the sentences, 
they might exert more control over their learning processes, which leads to equivalent 
memory for bizarre and common items.  
The memorability ratings have shown that although the participants predicted that 
their memory would be worse for bizarre items, memory performance for both types of 
sentences was similar. Considering that the memorability ratings show same direction 
tendencies as the vividness ratings, the memorability ratings might be related to some 
subjective encoding process, such as the ease of encoding (Begg, Duft, Lalonde, Melnick 
& Sanvito, 1989; Hertzog, Dunlosky, Robinson & Kidder, 2003). To explain, when the 
common items are presented to participants, they can comprehend the sentences very 
easily and process them more fluently, which gives them the feeling that they will be able 
to remember the items more easily. For bizarre items, participants have more difficulty in 
comprehending these items; thus, this difficulty in comprehension of the items leads to a 
subjective feeling that they will not be able to remember those items, leading to lower 
memorability ratings. There is no direct evidence that might suggest that vividness 
ratings and memorability ratings are driven by the same system. However, self-paced 
studies of bizarreness in which the participants move on the next item after they create an 
image show that the formation of the image takes longer for bizarre sentences (e.g. 
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McDaniel & Einstein, 1986; Robinson-Riegler & McDaniel, 1994). Research from 
metamemory literature show that the longer it takes to form an interactive image for word 
pairs, the less memorable participants rate the item through both judgments of learning 
(similar to memorability)and quality of encoding (similar to vividness ratings). However, 
the memory performance at final recall is uncorrelated with the time that it takes the 
participants to form the images (Hertzog et al., 2003). Thus, participants’ memorability 
ratings and vividness ratings might be driven by their successful encoding of the image. 
Yet, this fluency of formation does not necessarily help their retrieval of information, as 
shown by non-significant correlations between memorability and accuracy.   
 
 CHAPTER 7 
EXPERIMENT 6  
Experiments 3 and 4 showed that the size of the bizarreness effect was not 
reduced by either verbal or visual concurrent working memory tasks, even though the 
distractors reduced overall memory performance. However, the use of overt imagery 
instructions in these experiments may have induced participants to generate images in all 
conditions, in spite of the distractor task. That is, the directive to use imagery may have 
worked at cross-purposes with the visual distraction task, such that participants 
successfully used imagery despite the distractor task. For example, according to the 
multi-imagery process theory, bizarreness effect occurs because participants make 
multiple transformations on the images.  If they are not given overt instructions to 
construct an image, the concurrent visual working memory distractors might become 
more effective, leading to a reduced bizarreness effect.  
In Experiment 6, memorability ratings were replaced with plausibility ratings, in 
which participants judge whether the sentences describe events that can happen in real 
life. Even though many bizarreness studies use vividness ratings, previous research has 
successfully uncovered bizarreness effects using other types of ratings. Some studies 
have used “bizarreness” ratings (e.g. Kroll & Tu, 1988; McDaniel et al, 1995, 1999) and 
others have used pleasantness ratings (e.g. Worthen, 1997). The results suggest that 
although the bizarreness effect might be somewhat diminished, that the effect is still 
found, especially in the sentence access measure. Experiment 6 uses plausibility ratings, 
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because we feared that bizarreness ratings might induce imagery processing to a similar 
degree as vividness ratings.  The distractor task was the visual span task from Experiment 
3, which successfully reduced overall memory performance. The visual-imagery 
hypothesis predicts that the bizarreness effect should be reduced under visual distraction.  
Method 
Participants 
 Thirty-two participants participated in this experiment in exchange for course 
credit or monetary compensation.  
Materials and Procedure 
 The design was a 2 (sentence type: bizarre and common) x 2 (experimental 
condition: visual distraction vs. control). The methods were identical to Experiment 3, 
with a few modifications. The rating screen asked for “Plausibility (1-5)” instead of 
“Vividness (1-5)”. Participants were asked to think about the plausibility of the sentences 
that they read rather than generating images. They were instructed to rate the plausibility 
with a number from 1 to 5. A rating of 1 indicated that the event mentioned in the 
sentence could never happen in real life, and a rating of 5 indicated that it could definitely 
happen in real life. 
Results 
Concurrent WM Tasks  
The descriptive statistics for the visual and control groups are presented in Table 
6.  
Both the unconditional and the conditional measures of access and total noun 
recall were submitted to ANOVAs with the sentence type and experimental condition 
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(visual vs. control) as factors. The unconditional access measure revealed similar results 
to previous experiments: There was a main effect for the sentence type (F(1,30) = 15.60, 
MSe = .017, p<.01), with bizarre sentences accessed more often than common sentences. 
There was a main effect for the experimental condition (F(1,30) = 9.59, MSe = .028, 
p<.01), with more items accessed in the control condition, as compared to the visual 
working memory task condition. The interaction between the two factors was not 
significant (F<1). The total noun recall revealed a slightly less informative pattern than 
the access measure. The unconditional total noun recall revealed that there was a 
marginally significant main effect of sentence type (F(1,30) = 3.54, MSe = .012, p=.07). 
The total noun recall performance for the bizarre sentences (M = .30, SD = .13) was not 
significantly higher than the recall for the common sentences (M = .25, SD = .17). The 
main effect for the experimental condition was significant (F(1,30) = 171.90, MSe = .029, 
p<.01), with the control group (M = .31, SD = .14) performing better than the 
experimental group (M = .22, SD = .14). The interaction did not reach significance (F<1).  
The mean correct completion proportion for the verbal distractor task was .75, 
significantly above chance (t(15)= 9.97, d = .24, p<.01). Moreover, participants’ 
successful completion of the distractor task was not different for bizarre (M =.75, 
SD=.12) and common (M =.75, SD=.14) sentences (t(16)= .15, d = .0, p>.8). The 
conditional access measure followed the exact same pattern as the unconditional scores, 
with a significant main effect for the sentence type (F(1,30) = 10.89, MSe = .023, p<.01), 
a significant main effect for the experimental condition  type (F(1,30) = 5.31, MSe = .028, 
p<.05) and no interaction (F<1). The conditional total noun recall also revealed the same 
pattern as the unconditional total noun recall, a non-significant advantage for the bizarre 
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sentences (M = .31, SD = .14)  as compared to the common sentences (M = .27, SD = 
.16),  (F(1,30) = 2.54, MSe = .013, p<.10), a significant advantage in the control group (M 
= .34, SD = .14) as compared to the visual group  (M = .24, SD = .14) (F(1,30) = 6.47, 
MSe = .027), p<.01) , and no interaction (F<1).  
In order to argue against the role of visual encoding processes in the emergence of 
the bizarreness effect, it is necessary to conduct a pooled analysis of all experiments that 
test the visual account (Exp1-3 and 6). In order to realize this, all visual and visual 
control conditions of previous experiments were merged and submitted to a 2 (sentence 
type: bizarre vs common) x 2 (experimental condition: visual distraction vs control) 
ANOVA. The pooled results for the access measure yielded a main effect for the 
sentence type (F(1,146) = 95.88, MSe = .017, p<.01), with bizarre sentences (M =.44, 
SD=.17) accessed more often than common sentences (M =.28, SD=.15). There was also 
a main effect for the experimental condition (F(1,146) = 10.02, MSe = .033, p<.01), with 
more items accessed in the control condition (M =.39, SD=.15), as compared to the visual 
working memory task condition (M =.33, SD=.17). The interaction between the two 
factors was not significant (F(1,146) = 2.00, MSe = .019, p>.10). The total noun recall 
measure revealed the same pattern: a main effect for sentence type (F(1,146) = 58.104, 
MSe = .015, p<.01), a main effect for experimental condition (F(1,146) = 8.71, MSe = 
.031, p<.01) and no interaction (F(1,146) = 2.83, MSe = .015, p>.05). 
Plausibility ratings 
 Plausibility ratings were calculated separately for each sentence type and 
experimental condition and are shown on Table 7. Then, they were submitted to a 2 
(sentence type) by 2 (experimental condition) ANOVA. The results indicate that common 
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items were rated as more plausible than bizarre items (F(1,32) = 185.96, MSe = .801, 
p<.01). The main effect of the experimental condition was not significant (F<1), nor was 
the interaction (F(1,32) = 2.75, MSe = .801, p>.05).   
Discussion 
In this experiment, we investigated the role of visual distractors paired with 
encoding instructions that did not explicitly focus on imagery. Despite this change, the 
results were generally consistent with the findings of Experiment 3, in which the same 
visual distractor task was paired with explicit imagery instructions. First, there was a 
significant access advantage for bizarre sentences. In addition, the visual distraction 
condition reduced access to sentences in general. However, the size of the bizarreness 
effect was not reduced by visual distraction. Quite the opposite, numerically (if not 
significantly) the bizarreness effect was larger in the distraction than control condition. 
The results stayed the same for the conditional access scores, indicating that even when 
we only take into account those trials that participants were clearly paying attention to the 
concurrent working memory task, the access to bizarre sentences was higher than 
common sentences, and the size of the BE was unaffected by distraction.  Thus, at the 
end of 4 experiments, including all visual tasks (DVN, spatial tapping and visual pattern 
matrices), the failure to find any decrement in the bizarreness effect when participants are 
presented with visual concurrent tasks, we could conclude that the imaginal encoding 
hypothesis does not account for the superior memory for the bizarre sentences.   
The total noun measure was somewhat less informative: Participants recalled 
equivalent number of nouns from bizarre and common contexts. The experimental 
condition lowered total noun recall in general, but this effect was not moderated by the 
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sentence type, demonstrating that the failure to obtain the bizarreness in the total noun 
recall measure was not relevant to the concurrent visual memory task.  Prior studies have 
also shown that ratings other than vividness do not produce the bizarreness effect in the 
total noun recall measure, or the effect is sometimes smaller (e.g. Worthen & Roark, 
2002; Kroll & Tu, 1988; Worthen, 1997), so it is not quite surprising that total noun 
recall did not yield a significant bizarreness effect.  
In a cross experimental comparison of the instructions (Experiment 3 vs. 6), the 
results show that when participants are asked to use the vividness ratings, the bizarreness 
effect is obtained with both measures of access and total noun recall. However, when 
they are asked to judge the sentences for their plausibility, the bizarreness effect is 
reduced in the total noun recall measure. Thus, rather than the visual working memory 
task, there seems to be something special about the instructions given to participants. An 
informal cross-experimental comparison of the two experiments shows that the only 
value that changes for the total noun recall is that participants are able to recall more 
nouns from the common sentences when they make plausibility ratings as compared to 
vividness ratings. Even though these experiments were conducted at different times of 
year, plausibility ratings seem to help participants increase their performance for common 
items. This might have to do with the involvement of semantic verbal processes in 
plausibility ratings. With vividness ratings, participants’ attention are attracted to bizarre 
items as compared to common sentences, but when participants are asked to judge 
sentences for their plausibility, they might be making more semantic verbal elaborations 
for common sentences, and the difference between common and bizarre sentences might 
decrease, so plausibility differentially increases the semantic elaboration of common 
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items, leading to a decreased bizarreness effect on the total noun recall. Therefore, in 
such a case, one would expect that, if the participants are doing a verbal task while they 
are judging the plausibility of the sentences, the bizarreness effect should re-emerge in 
the total noun recall measure, as the participants would not able to pay attention to the 
common sentences as much. As a consequence, it is important to see whether using 
plausibility ratings paired with verbal distraction tasks leads to the re-emergence of the 
bizarreness effect in the total noun recall, as compared to a control condition. This 
possibility will be tested in Experiment 7.    
 A pooled analysis was also conducted for all the experiments that had a visual 
distraction condition, in order to argue against the lack of power in each experiment. The 
results clearly showed that even though the visual distraction tasks caused a general 
decrement in the memory performance, there was no evidence that visual distractors 
reduced the size of the bizarreness effect. This analysis clearly argues against any visual 
explanations of the bizarreness effect. A more elaborate discussion of this finding can be 
found in the general discussion section. 
 
 CHAPTER 8 
EXPERIMENT 7 
The previous experiment showed that the use of visual distractors along with the 
plausibility ratings leads to a general decrement in memory performance. Moreover, 
plausibility ratings led to a reduced bizarreness effect possibly indicating that judgments 
of plausibility lead to greater verbal elaboration especially for the common sentences. If 
so, the use of plausibility instructions along with a verbal distractor task may lead to the 
re-emergence of the bizarreness effect. Up to now, it was hypothesized that the verbal 
distractors should lead to a reduced bizarreness effect, if the effect is moderated by verbal 
rehearsal. In this experiment, the exact opposite view is entertained, because Experiment 
6 showed that plausibility judgments might be leading to increased elaboration for the 
common items, reducing the size of the effect, because common item are rehearsed more. 
Thus, one would expect that if participants are presented with verbal distractors, this 
might again decrease the selective rehearsal of the common items, leading to a re-
emergence of the bizarreness effect in total recall measure. This experiment tries to assess 
this account by pairing the plausibility instructions along with verbal distractor tasks.  
Another reason for conducting this experiment is to complete the evaluation of the 
slave working memory processes in the emergence of the bizarreness effect. In all the 
prior experiments, there was no evidence that either visual or verbal distractors reduced 
the BE. As a complement to Experiment 6, Experiment 7 investigated the effect of verbal 
distraction along with plausibility instructions.    
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Method 
Participants 
24 participants participated in this experiment in exchange for course credit or 
monetary compensation.  
Materials and Procedure 
 The design was a 2 (sentence type: bizarre and common) x 2 (experimental 
condition: verbal distraction vs. control). The methods were identical to Experiment 4, 
with one change. Participants were asked to think about the plausibility of the sentences 
rather than generating images, and rate the plausibility as in Experiment 6. 
Results 
Concurrent WM tasks 
The descriptive statistics for the verbal and the control groups are displayed in 
Table 8.   
The proportion of access was submitted to 2 (sentence type) x 2 (experimental 
condition) ANOVA, revealing a main effect of sentence type, with bizarre sentences 
accessed more often than common sentences (F(1,22) = 4.41, MSe= .027, p<.05). All 
other effects were nonsignificant (Fs<1).  The analyses for the total noun recall revealed 
no significant effects. To explain, the bizarreness effect was not obtained when the 
plausibility ratings were used (F(1,22) = 2.72, MSe = .022, p > .05). Moreover, the verbal 
task failed to impair the memory performance (F<1).  
The mean correct completion proportion for the verbal distractor task was .91 
with a standard deviation of .08, significantly above chance (t(11)= 17.13, d = .41, 
p<.01). A paired samples t-test showed that participants’ successful completion of the 
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distractor task was marginally different in bizarre (M =.86, SD=.11) and common (M 
=.95, SD=.08) sentence conditions (t(11)= 2.15, d = .08, p=.054). The conditional access 
measure revealed the identical pattern as unconditional scores, with a main effect for the 
sentence type (F(1,23) = 4.96, MSe= 1.36, p<.05), and all the other effects insignificant 
(Fs<1).  Thus, even though the bizarreness effect for the access measure was obtained in 
this condition, the presence of a verbal task paired with the plausibility ratings did not 
reduce performance in general. Moreover, the bizarreness effect remained intact in the 
verbal distraction condition. The conditional scores for total noun recall were the similar 
to the unconditional score analyses: all the effects failed to reach significance (F<1), even 
though the sentence type was marginally significant in the expected direction (F(1,22) = 
3.03, MSe= .020, p=.06).  
In order to argue against the role of verbal encoding processes in the emergence 
of the bizarreness effect, it is necessary to conduct a pooled analysis of all experiments 
that test the verbal account (Exp1, 2, 4 and 7). In order to realize this, all verbal and 
control conditions of previous experiments were merged and submitted to a 2 (sentence 
type: bizarre vs. common) x 2 (experimental condition: verbal distraction vs. control) 
ANOVA. The pooled results for the access measure suggested a main effect for the 
sentence type (F(1,130) = 68.58, MSe = .022, p<.01), with bizarre sentences (M =.45, 
SD=.16) accessed more often than common sentences (M =.30, SD=.16). There was no 
main effect for the experimental condition (F(1,130) = 2.21, MSe = .019, p<.01) and no 
interaction (F<1). The total noun recall measure revealed the same pattern: a main effect 
for sentence type (F(1,130) = 45.60, MSe = .017, p<.01), no main effect for experimental 
condition (F(1,130) = 1.48, MSe = .028, p>.10) and no interaction (F<1).  
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Plausibility Ratings 
Plausibility ratings were submitted to a 2 (sentence type) by 2 (experimental 
condition) ANOVA. The results indicate that common items were rated as more plausible 
than bizarre items (F(1,22) = 2124.89, MSe = .069, p<.01). The main effect of the 
experimental condition was not significant (F(1,22) = 1.28, MSe = .085, p>.20), nor was 
the interaction (F<1). 
Discussion 
As in Experiment 6, Experiment 7 produced the bizarreness effect with the 
sentence recall measure, but not with the total noun recall measure, although the latter 
measure exhibited a trend for the effect. If anything, the size of the bizarreness is 
numerically higher in the verbal distraction condition than in the control condition. The 
finding that the size of the bizarreness effect was not reduced through the use of verbal 
distractors along with plausibility ratings produce further evidence that the phonological 
loop is not involved in the bizarreness effect, in agreement with the findings of 
Experiments 1, 2 and 4.  
A surprising finding was that there was no main effect for the verbal distractor in 
reducing the general memory performance. This finding might have actually been a 
consequence of the participant pool, since the experiments for the verbal distraction 
group were run before the control group. If the control group of the experiment 7 is 
compared to the control group of experiment 6 (in which the timing and the instructions 
are the same), the experiment 6 has higher scores in general for the control group. This 
might actually provide further proof for the change in the quality of the participants in the 
pool.    
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In order to argue that the experiments that tested the role of verbal encoding 
processes had sufficient power, a pooled analysis of all experiments that test the verbal 
account was conducted. The results revealed that the size of the bizarreness effect was 
not reduced by the verbal tasks. This argues against the role of verbal elaboration in the 
emergence of the bizarreness effect. The general discussion section will elaborate on this 
finding further, and indicate what might be important in the emergence of the bizarreness 
effect.  
 CHAPTER 9 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Evaluation of the Role of Verbal and Visual Encoding Processes in the Emergence of the 
Bizarreness Effect and Possible Future Directions 
 The goal of the current project was to determine the reasons for the emergence of 
the bizarreness effect. There have been two categories of accounts for this effect. One of 
the accounts focuses on visual imagery processes. There are different variations of the 
hypothesis, but the general idea is that when participants generate images for both 
common and bizarre items, the images for the bizarre items are visually more distinctive 
(McDaniel, 1986), or require more transformations in their creation (Wollen & Margres, 
1987), which leads to better encoding for these items and, therefore, greater recall. The 
other category of accounts depends on verbal rehearsal processes. One version of the 
verbal rehearsal account claims that when participants encounter sentences that are 
bizarre, these sentences are harder to understand; thus, they make more verbal 
elaborations to understand the sentence, leading to increased memory traces for bizarre 
sentences (Imai & Richman, 1991).  Another version of the verbal rehearsal account 
focuses on the unusualness of the bizarre items. According to this account, in lists 
consisting of bizarre and common sentences, bizarre information lures attention, leading 
to increased elaboration for those items at the expense of decreased elaboration for the 
common items (McDaniel & Bugg, 2008). Extant research typically used encoding 
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instructions to encourage one type of processing or the other, in order to understand the 
effect.  But as reviewed in the introduction, most of these results do not unambiguously 
favor one type of account or the other. In this project, the main goal was to discourage 
one of the processes during sentence encoding through the use of a concurrent working 
memory task known to selectively impair either verbal or visual WM, to investigate 
whether the size of the bizarreness effect decreases in any of the distraction conditions.  
 The role of the visual processes in the emergence of the bizarreness effect was 
investigated in Experiments 1-3 and 6. Experiment 1 used dynamic visual noise, 
Experiment 2 used spatial tapping, and Experiment 3 used the visual patterns task. None 
of the distraction conditions reduced the size of the bizarreness effect, providing no 
evidence that the bizarreness effect relies on visual WM processes. It is important to 
emphasize that all these tasks are well known to selectively disrupt visual working 
memory processes. DVN disrupts visual processing, but leaves verbal rehearsal intact 
(e.g. Quinn & McConnell, 1996, 2006). Similarly, spatial tapping leads to decrements in 
visuospatial processing, but does not interfere with free recall of words (Salway & Logie, 
1995). Visual patterns task leads to decrements in processing of other visual stimuli 
(Della Sala et al, 1999). One might argue that the initial tasks may not be strong enough 
to disrupt long-term memory at all in distraction conditions. However, even when the 
task was strong enough to disrupt overall memory performance (Experiments 3 and 6), 
the size of the bizarreness effects remained undiminished.  
 The role of the verbal processes in the emergence of the bizarreness effect was 
investigated in Experiments 1, 2, 4 and 7. Experiment 1 used irrelevant speech, 
Experiment 2 used articulatory suppression and Experiment 4 used the letter span task. 
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All these tasks are known to depress verbal working memory. For example, backward 
speech leads to decrements in free recall of word lists, but not visual information 
(Oswald, Tremblay & Jones, 2000). Articulatory suppression leads to decrements when 
paired with other verbal tasks, but not with visual tasks (Cocchini et al, 2002). Letter 
spans are depressed when used along with other verbal tasks (Logie, Zucco &Baddeley, 
1990). Again, even though these tasks are well known to load on the phonological loop, 
none of these concurrent verbal WM tasks reduced the size of the bizarreness effect, 
indicating that the phonological loop does not contribute to the emergence of the 
bizarreness effect. Moreover, even those tasks which caused some decrement in overall 
memory performance (Experiment 4) did not reduce the bizarreness effect.   
 Experiments 1-4 used explicit imagery instructions (vividness ratings) to make 
sure that we obtained the greatest difference between bizarre and common items in the 
control condition to maximize the chance of observing any interactions with the 
experimental conditions.  Experiments 5-7 used encoding instructions that do not 
explicitly focus on visual imagery in order to see if the sensitivity of the bizarreness 
effect to distraction changed. The reasoning behind this was to determine if the use of 
imagery instructions renders the bizarreness effect resistant to any type of distraction. 
Experiment 5 used intentional instructions which eliminated the bizarreness effect in the 
control condition. Thus, intentional instructions were not used any further. Experiment 6 
and Experiment 7 used plausibility ratings, paired with visual and verbal distractor tasks. 
Earlier research made use of ratings such as bizarreness and pleasantness in addition to 
vividness and memorability. However, when participants are asked to judge how bizarre 
or pleasant a sentence is, they might have a tendency to form images. Thus, I chose to use 
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plausibility ratings, where participants are asked whether the sentence would be plausible 
in real life. Thus, they need to make reference to their world knowledge and long term 
memory structures to indicate the level of plausibility. This manipulation does not 
necessarily rule out imagery processing; however, using these instructions might lessen 
the reliance on imagery processing during encoding and focus more on semantic 
processes. First, the results indicated that the bizarreness effect is obtained in the control 
group with instructions that do not explicitly require imagery. However, the superior 
performance for bizarre sentences is not as pronounced with plausibility ratings as it is 
with vividness ratings: the sentence access measure produced a significant effect, but 
total noun recall produced only a marginally significant effect in both Experiment 6 and 
7. More centrally, the distraction conditions did not reduce the size of the bizarreness 
effect in either of the experiments. Thus, even when participants were not instructed to 
create mental images, which might have overridden any visual or verbal distraction 
processes, the results did not indicate any role for the phonological loop or the 
visuospatial sketchpad in producing the effect.   
Perhaps the most important contribution of this study is that the results argue 
against the role of imagery in the bizarreness effect. Starting from ancient Greek memory 
traditions to modern self-help books, from general folk knowledge to modern 
psychological research, the bizarreness effect has often been considered as a consequence 
of imagery. The ancient Greek tradition instructed people to form strange images in order 
to memorize speeches (Yates, 1966). Today’s self-help books claim that in order to 
memorize names, lists or numbers, people should try to generate images that are unusual 
or bizarre (Buzan, 1991; Lorayne, 2010; Lucas  & Lorayne, 1973; Trudeau, 1997) . In 
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daily life, students try to learn information by coming up with weird images of the events. 
In modern psychological research, the bizarreness effect has been accepted to rely on 
imagery to the extent that it is sometimes called the bizarre imagery effect. Thus, many 
different sources have considered the bizarreness effect to be a consequence of imagery. 
Yet, the results of this project have consistently shown that the bizarreness effect does not 
depend on visuospatial processing. The pooled analyses of the experiments that have 
tested the visual account has shown that the effect is even more apparent in the visual 
distraction condition (numerically if not significantly) than the control condition.  
Looking at the visual imagery accounts, McDaniel and Einstein (1986) have argued for 
the visual distinctiveness of the bizarre sentences as compared to common sentences. 
According to this account, vividness ratings lead participants to engage in imaginal 
processing, making the bizarre items processed extensively through the visual system. In 
evidence for this account, it has been found that the bizarreness effect is obtained 
consistently with the vividness instructions (e.g. Einstein & McDaniel, 1987), but not 
consistently with other types of orienting tasks (e.g. Burns, 1996). Another account, 
similarly, indicates that when participants are asked to create images for bizarre 
sentences, the created visual images have to go through more transformations, because 
the visual images are not schematic in nature. To explain, in order to create an image for 
the sentence The dog rode the bicycle down the street, the image of the dog needs to be 
changed more (e.g. dog rotated into a sitting position, have front legs extended to the 
handle bar, hind legs extended to reach the pedals), leading to more effort on the part of 
the participants, thus more memory traces for the visual transformations (Wollen & 
Margres, 1987). In evidence for this, some studies have found that the more visual 
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transformations that the image has to go through, the better the recall is. Yet, there is also 
much evidence against the visual-imagery account. For example, the effect is obtained 
with different orienting tasks that focus on verbal rehearsal (i.e. Worthen, 1997; Worthen 
& Roark, 2002). Secondly, there is no relationship between imaging ability and the 
bizarreness effect (Anderson & Buyer, 1994). One would expect that bizarreness effect 
would be more pronounced for those participants with higher imaging abilities, if it 
depended on visual processing.  When we look at the results in the current project in 
which visual working memory distractor tasks are employed, the results do not provide 
any evidence for the involvement of visual working memory, even though the distractor 
tasks are well known to reduce or interfere with visual processing.  
The role of verbal processing is a little more complicated, as sometimes the 
instructions that focus more on the verbal rehearsal (plausibility & intentional 
instructions) reduce the effect, but again the pooled analysis of the results do not suggest 
any decrement in the emergence of the bizarreness effect in the verbal distraction 
condition. 
 This project tested the effect of verbal and visual working memory processes with 
different concurrent working memory tasks and different instructions. A systematic 
examination of distraction conditions and instructions showed that selectively impairing 
the phonological loop or the visuospatial sketchpad did not moderate the size of the 
bizarreness effect.  If these two systems are not responsible for producing the effect, what 
mechanism might actually be responsible? One possibility is the central executive. As 
explained earlier, the working memory system consists of three different components. 
Phonological loop and visuospatial sketchpad are the two slaves systems that deal with 
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storage and manipulation of verbal and visual information, and work independently of 
each other. On the other hand, the central executive is an amodal supervisory system, 
which controls the flow of information from and to its slave systems. It is hypothesized to 
bind information coming from a number of different sources, to coordinate the slave 
systems, and to selectively activate and inhibit information. Thus, it is quite possible that 
the bizarreness effect goes beyond the effect of the slave systems and is more 
appropriately attributed to the central executive. Baddeley (2003) defined the role of 
central executive in the working memory in two different components: The first part is 
the control of behavior by habit patterns and schemas, implicitly guided by cues provided 
by the environment. This component is more automatic and it does not require too many 
resources. The second comprised an attentionally limited controller, the supervisory 
activating system (SAS) that can intervene when routine control is not sufficient.  The 
bizarreness effect might actually be moderated by one of these subcomponents or the 
interaction between these two subcomponents of the central executive system.  
There are several possible ways that the central executive might be involved in 
the bizarreness effect. One possibility has to do with the automatic orientation of 
attention to distinctive information. To explain, one of the ways that the bizarreness 
effect can be thought of is in terms of its distinctiveness relative to general world 
knowledge and long term memory structures (Schmidt, 1999). When the target item is 
unusual with respect to the general world knowledge of the participants, it attracts 
attention. For example, when participants read sentences in a mixed list of common and 
bizarre sentences, they might have a tendency to use the more habitual system for 
common sentences, but bizarre sentences might have a tendency to attract attention 
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automatically, leading to more extensive traces for bizarre sentences. Thus, simple 
material like word lists might be disrupted through the use of concurrent verbal tasks. 
Similarly, when participants are shown simple pictures, visual concurrent working 
memory tasks might reduce subsequent memory.  However, lists that involve sentential 
material requiring more effort for the comprehension, like the bizarreness effect, the 
capture of our attention by the “unusual” is quite involuntary, and that orienting of 
attention and comprehension is sufficient to obtain the effect. 
There is a phenomenon similar to the bizarreness effect, called meaning-after-
effort effect, which might be indicative of how simple comprehension of sentences might 
enhance memory (Auble & Franks, 1978; Auble, Franks, & Soraci, 1979; Zaromb & 
Roediger, 2009). In this phenomenon, participants are presented with ambiguous 
sentences, such as “the clothes were ruined because the sign vanished”, which are 
presented with or without their disambiguating cues (i.e. wet paint). The results indicate 
that when participants are asked to remember the sentences later, the free recall for 
sentences with disambiguating cues are significantly better as compared to sentences with 
no disambiguating cues. Auble et al has attributed this memory advantage to the sudden 
transition from non-comprehension to comprehension, when an initially ambiguous 
stimulus is suddenly comprehended, as long as the stimulus is initially ambiguous and 
then comprehension is ultimately achieved. Zaromb and Roediger (2009) have 
categorized the meaning after effort effect as an effect associated with the item-order 
account. According to this explanation, the transition from non-comprehension to 
comprehension makes the comprehended items more distinctive. Thus, just the mere 
comprehension of the bizarre sentences and the automatic guiding of attention to those 
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items might be responsible for the emergence of the bizarreness effect. One finding that 
might elucidate this similarity between bizarreness and the meaning-after-effort effect is 
that the experiments conducted with complex bizarre sentences and anomalous sentences. 
These experiments have revealed that in short periods of time, the bizarreness effect is 
not obtained; however, if sufficient time is provided to participants, the bizarreness effect 
emerges again. The extra time might be responsible for the transition from non-
comprehension to comprehension of complex or anomalous bizarre sentences (Imai & 
Richman, 1991; Richman, 1994). Thus, the increased time might moderate the effect by 
enabling comprehension, and this transition itself might lead to increased memory traces 
for bizarre sentences, beyond any visual or verbal rehearsal.        
Another possibility in the emergence of the bizarreness effect might be relevant to 
the other subcomponent of the central executive, which is involved in more controlled 
processes. The idea is that the process by which the bizarre items enhance memory is not 
automatic, and when participants encounter bizarre sentences, they start paying attention 
to the sentences, which leads to increased controlled processes that are associated with 
the verbal rehearsal. However, the results of the experiments presented here argue against 
the account for controlled verbal rehearsal for bizarre sentences, as we find that the size 
of the bizarreness effect is not diminished in the verbal distraction condition.  
For the reasons indicated above, the central executive appears as a viable 
candidate for producing the bizarreness effect. Future studies should investigate the role 
of central executive processes through the use of distractor tasks that disrupt central 
executive processes. One way this could be realized is to use different tasks that interfere 
with different functions of the central executive. To be clearer, it is important to see by 
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which process the central executive might guide the bizarreness effect. The central 
executive is hypothesized to be responsible for several functions such as binding 
information from different sources, selective attention, updating and control. Thus, if a 
manipulation could be found in order to occupy the automatic or the controlled processes 
of the central executive, this might lead to a reduced bizarreness effect. For example, 
random number generation, in which participants are asked to generate random numbers 
between two boundary numbers in a limited time, has been shown to put demands on the 
central executive (Barnard, Scott & May, 2001).  In the bizarreness effect experiments, 
participants could be asked shown two numbers (e.g. 202-598) before they start reading 
the sentences and asked to generate four random numbers between these two numbers 
throughout the trial (one number per every other second that is signaled by a metronome 
over the headphones).    
It is also important to note that the two subsystems of the central executive sound 
suspiciously similar to the automatic and controlled processes of attention (e.g. Engle, 
2002). The attentional approach to the bizarreness effect is not a new approach.  
According to this view, bizarre items use up more of the cognitive resources during 
processing: They attract more attention and are elaborated more, leading to an advantage 
for bizarre items at the expense of decreased performance for common items.  Many 
experimenters have included an attentional component in their explanation of the 
bizarreness effect (Cox & Wollen, 1981, McDaniel & Bugg, 2008, Wollen & Cox. 1981, 
Wollen & Margres, 1987). One of the ways researchers have tried to test how much 
attention is allotted to bizarre sentences was to manipulate the time provided to 
participants. The general reasoning was that fast processing of bizarre items should 
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eliminate the increased attention allocated to bizarre items, leading to similar 
performance for common and bizarre items. For example, in a study by Waddill and 
McDaniel (1998), half of the participants were exposed to a mixed list of bizarre and 
common sentences for five seconds, whereas the control group received them in a slower 
pace of 18 seconds. The results revealed a main effect for sentence type and processing 
time, with an advantage for recall performance for the sentences processed for 18 seconds 
and an advantage for bizarre sentences, but there was no significant interaction between 
the processing time and the sentence type, contrary to the predictions. The concern in 
operationalizing attention as time allocation is that participants may continue to process 
bizarre items as they are presented with common items (selectively displaced rehearsal), 
which cannot be measured through the time allocation manipulation.    
Another way that the attentional approach was tested was to see how intensively 
the resources are being used up while processing common and bizarre sentences. By this 
logic, Worthen, Garcia-Rivas, Green and Vidos (2000) operationalized resource 
allocation as the reaction time to a secondary task while trying to form images during the 
encoding of common and bizarre sentences. In a mixed-subjects design with the sentence 
type as the within subjects variable and type of secondary task as the between subjects 
variable, participants had to form images of common and bizarre sentences. In some 
trials, a message asking participants to “press any key” would appear either at 2 seconds 
or 2.5 seconds after the presentation of the sentences. The reaction time to this task was 
used to measure attentional allocation. Although the bizarreness effect was produced on 
the later memory test, response to the secondary task did not reveal any significant effect 
of sentence type (Experiment 1).  The performance for the secondary task was not 
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moderated by predominantly common lists (Experiment 2), or more immediate key press 
response (Experiment 3, Experiment 4). Worthen et al (2000) explained this finding by 
rejecting the role of the attentional resources in the emergence of the bizarreness effect. 
However, it is important to address how the secondary task in this experiment might have 
failed to interfere with the bizarreness effects. In terms of the resources that are used, 
secondary task might not have required a serious allocation of cognitive resources for 
completing the primary task, especially considering that the key-press response is an 
automatic response, leading to null effects. Thus, up to now, no rigorous studies of 
attention have been conducted to investigate its role in the emergence of the bizarreness 
effect. Future studies should focus on more rigorous attentional tasks that consume more 
resources that require participants to respond more continuously. 
Evaluation of Vividness Ratings, Memorability Ratings and Accuracy 
A secondary aspect of the current experiments was the relationship between 
bizarreness and various ratings for each sentence. A common finding that was replicated 
in the current research is that bizarre items are rated as less vivid than common items. 
There are two views regarding this relationship. Wollen and Margres (1987) argued that 
the lower vividness ratings were a consequence of the extra visual transformations 
required for creating bizarre images. The more the image differed from schematic 
images, the less vividly the participant could imagine it. Marshall, Nau and Chandler 
(1979, 1980) found that the more visual transformations that the participants had to make, 
the better the recall was, but they did not look at the relationship between vividness and 
accuracy.  
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 Thus, one would expect that if the vividness ratings are negatively correlated 
with the number of transformations, and if the number of transformations is positively 
correlated with recall for both common and bizarre items, then less vivid ratings would 
predict greater memory.  In order to see whether this was actually the case, for the first 4 
experiments, the correlations between vividness, accuracy, experimental condition and 
bizarreness were analyzed (For a detailed explanation of the analyses, please refer to 
general description for the vividness-accuracy analyses in Appendix. B.) These analyses 
suggested that the relationship between the vividness ratings and the memory accuracy 
was quite inconsistent across experiments. For example, in Experiment 1 lower vividness 
scores were correlated with higher memory accuracy for bizarre sentences, but the 
reversed pattern was obtained for the common sentences. In Experiment 2, vividness 
ratings for bizarre sentences did not correlate with memory accuracy, but higher 
vividness scores for common sentences were correlated with more accurate memory. In 
Experiment 3, lower vividness ratings were correlated with more accurate memory for 
bizarre sentences, but there was no correlation between vividness and accuracy for the 
common sentences.  Considering that the results are so inconsistent, it is difficult to argue 
that more transformations actually lead to better memory. Moreover, considering that we 
have no evidence for the role of visual working memory in the bizarreness effect, the 
vividness ratings might be related to some encoding condition that has no bearing over 
the recall.   
 Another more viable possibility is that vividness ratings are related to the 
subjective ease of encoding. One of the factors determining whether an item is rated as 
more vivid is speed of encoding. For example, Hertzog et al (2003) used paired-associate 
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learning to investigate the hypothesis that the speed of generating an interactive image 
determined the vividness rating for the image (which they called, Quality of encoding). In 
their experiment, participants were given word pairs and asked to form interactive images 
and press a key as soon as they formed the image. This was followed either by quality of 
encoding ratings (QUE), in which participants indicated how good the image was 
(Experiment 1), or by judgments of learning (JOL), in which participants indicated how 
likely they were to remember the pair on a later memory test (Experiment 2). The results 
showed that the latency of the key press indicating successful image formation was 
negatively related to both QUEs and JOLs. On the other hand, actual memory 
performance was unrelated to the time to form an image. Self-paced studies of the 
bizarreness effect usually show that it takes longer to understand the sentences and create 
an image for bizarre than common items (Robinson-Riegler & McDaniel, 1994; Waddill 
& McDaniel, 1998). Thus, the vividness ratings might be driven by the time that it takes 
for participants to create the image. Certainly, there is no sure way of telling whether this 
was the case in the present experiments, as the participants were given a fixed time to 
read the sentence and create an image, but the subjective ease of encoding seems to be a 
good candidate for explaining why bizarre items are rated less vividly than common 
items.  
 One of the future directions could be to conduct self-paced studies of bizarreness 
to investigate two issues. The first issue is whether different ratings such as vividness, 
bizarreness, comprehensibility and memorability correlate with the time to encode these 
sentences. For example, the participants could be asked to press a key as soon as they 
successfully complete the task (e.g. comprehend the sentence, create an image or evaluate 
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its plausibility) and see whether the time difference to encode bizarre and common 
sentences drive the correlations between ratings and timing. To explain, considering that 
in self-paced studies, bizarre sentences take longer to encode than common sentences, it 
is useful to see whether self-perceived difficulty, as measured by the time that it takes to 
encode these sentences, correlate with the ratings of vividness, comprehensibility or 
plausibility of the sentences.    
The second issue to investigate is whether the extended time to comprehend 
bizarre sentences and create images correlates with actual memory performance. 
Interestingly enough, even though imagery has been used to investigate participants’ 
beliefs in their future performance, the bizarreness effect has not been investigated in the 
context of how metamemorial judgments correlate with memory accuracy. For an 
experimental paradigm in which we know that the comprehension times are longer for 
the distinctive items, it is interesting that the researchers have not investigated the 
relationship between encoding time and recall.        
 Another interesting question that emerged in Experiment 5, where memorability 
ratings were used along with intentional memory instructions, was the dissociation 
between the memorability and the actual memory performance. The memory 
performance for bizarre and common items was not significantly different; yet, 
participants’ ratings for bizarre sentences were lower than common sentences. The 
finding that bizarre sentences are rated as less memorable may provide further proof that 
the ratings are not necessarily driven by some diagnostic cue of recall, but solely the 
subjective ease by which the sentence is understood, as found in Hertzog et al (2003). 
Looking at the bizarreness effect from the perspective of metamemory may give us 
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further clues as to whether and how monitoring of information for different types of 
sentences that might or might not fit into our schemas of general world knowledge, might 
enhance our memory. 
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Table 1.  
Means and Standard Deviations for Memory Performance in Experiment 1 
Experimental Condition   Access Total Noun Recall 
 
 
Bizarre Common Bizarre Common 
verbal distraction control 
Mean 0.54 0.32 0.39 0.26 
Std. Dev. 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.14 
verbal distraction 
Mean 0.49 0.25 0.42 0.22 
Std. Dev 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.15 
visual distraction control 
Mean 0.45 0.39 0.34 0.31 
Std. Dev 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.16 
visual distraction 
Mean 0.59 0.3 0.49 0.25 
Std. Dev 0.19 0.15 0.15 0.14 
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Table 2. 
Means and Standard Deviations for Memory Performance and Vividness Ratings in 
Experiment 2 
Experimental Condition Access Total Noun Recall Vividness 
 
 
Bizarre Common Bizarre Common Bizarre Common 
Control 
Mean 0.48 0.32 0.38 0.26 2.82 4.06 
Std. 
Dev. 
0.13 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.89 0.69 
Visuospatial 
WM task 
Mean 0.43 0.26 0.36 0.21 3.36 4.17 
Std. 
Dev. 
0.20 0.13 0.19 0.11 0.78 0.83 
Verbal WM 
task 
Mean 0.45 0.33 0.35 0.28 3.41 4.15 
Std. 
Dev. 
0.19 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.96 0.81 
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Table 3. 
Means and Standard Deviations for Memory Performance in Experiment 3 
 
Type of score 
 
Experimental 
Condition 
  Access Total Noun Recall 
  
 
Bizarre Common Bizarre Common 
 
Visual 
Distraction 
Mean 0.33 0.20 0.22 0.14 
Unconditional 
scores 
Std. Dev. 0.18 0.11 0.14 0.1 
Control 
Mean 0.45 0.28 0.37 0.24 
  Std. Dev. 0.18 0.15 0.19 0.16 
 
Visual 
Distraction 
Mean 0.29 0.18 0.2 0.15 
Conditional 
scores 
Std. Dev. 0.18 0.13 0.14 0.11 
Control 
Mean 0.45 0.28 0.37 0.24 
  Std. Dev. 0.18 0.15 0.19 0.16 
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Table 4. 
 
Means and Standard Deviations for Memory Performance in Experiment 4 
 
Type of score 
Experimental 
Condition 
  Access Total Noun Recall 
  
 
Bizarre Common Bizarre Common 
 
Visual 
Distraction 
Mean 0.35 0.22 0.26 0.15 
Unconditional 
scores 
Std. Dev. 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.12 
Control 
Mean 0.46 0.29 0.39 0.25 
  Std. Dev. 0.12 0.17 0.15 0.15 
 
Visual 
Distraction 
Mean 0.34 0.24 0.24 0.17 
Conditional 
scores 
Std. Dev. 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.12 
Control 
Mean 0.46 0.29 0.39 0.25 
  Std. Dev. 0.12 0.17 0.15 0.15 
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Table 5.  
Means and Standard Deviations for Memory Performance and Memorability Ratings in 
Experiment 5 
 
Experimental 
Condition 
  Access Total Noun Recall Memorability 
 
 
Bizarre Common Bizarre Common Bizarre Common 
Control 
Mean 0.38 0.35 0.35 0.3 2.87 3.22 
Std. 
Dev. 
0.16 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.53 0.50 
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Table 6.  
Means and Standard Deviations for Memory Performance in Experiment 6 
 
Type of score 
Experimental 
Condition 
  Access Total Noun Recall 
  
 
Bizarre Common Bizarre Common 
 
Visual 
Distraction 
Mean 0.34 0.19 0.26 0.18 
Unconditional 
scores 
Std. Dev. (0.12) (0.18) (0.10) (0.17) 
Control 
Mean 0.45 0.34 0.35 0.33 
  
Std. Dev. (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) 
 
Visual 
Distraction 
Mean 0.37 0.22 0.27 0.20 
Conditional 
scores 
Std. Dev. (0.18) (0.17) (0.12) (0.16) 
Control 
Mean 0.45 0.34 0.35 0.33 
  Std. Dev. (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) 
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Table 7.  
 
Plausibility Ratings for Experiment 6 
 
Experimental Condition Plausibility 
  
Bizarre Common 
Visual 
Mean 1.64 4.32 
Std. Dev. (.94) (1.01) 
Control 
Mean 1.28 4.71 
Std. Dev. (.26) (.25) 
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Table 8.  
 
Means and Standard Deviations for Memory Performance in Experiment 7 
 
 
Type of score 
Experimental 
Condition 
  Access Total Noun Recall 
  
 
Bizarre Common Bizarre Common 
 
Visual 
Distraction 
Mean 0.40 0.27 0.33 0.24 
Unconditional 
scores 
Std. Dev. (0.18) (0.11) (0.14) (0.10) 
Control 
Mean 0.36 0.29 0.31 0.26 
  
Std. Dev. (0.20) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) 
 
Visual 
Distraction 
Mean 0.42 0.27 0.35 0.24 
Conditional 
scores 
Std. Dev. (0.19) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) 
Control 
Mean 0.36 0.29 0.31 0.26 
  Std. Dev. (0.20) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) 
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Table 9.  
 
Plausibility ratings for Experiment 7 
 
Experimental Condition Plausibility 
 
 
Bizarre Common 
Verbal 
Mean 1.27 4.83 
Std. Deviation (.29) (.20) 
Control 
Mean 1.23 4.68 
Std. Deviation (.25) (.34) 
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Appendix A: 
Sentence Materials for Experiments 1-7 
Common Sentences Bizarre Sentences 
The banker dropped the newspaper in the 
puddle. 
The banker floated across the puddle on 
a newspaper. 
The biscuits were visible through the 
oven window. 
The biscuits screamed when the oven 
jumped out the window. 
The butterfly was examined by the 
biologist using the microscope. 
The butterfly examined the biologist 
using a microscope. 
The baby put the rattle in his mouth. The rattle put the baby in its mouth. 
The doughnuts on the floor were covered 
with ants. 
The ants spit the doughnuts on the floor. 
The maid spilled ammonia on the table. The maid licked ammonia off the table. 
The goldfish was swimming in the bowl 
next to the sofa. 
The goldfish was eating out of the bowl 
on the sofa. 
The spider crawled on the plant which 
was on the porch. 
The spider watered the plant on the 
porch. 
The dog chased the bicycle down the 
street. 
The dog rode the bicycle down the 
street. 
The camper found a mosquito on his 
binoculars. 
The mosquito sighted the camper 
through the binoculars. 
The fisherman pulled the lobster out of 
the barrel. 
The lobster pulled the fisherman out of 
the barrel. 
The burglar found a necklace under the 
mattress. 
The mattress strangled the burglar with 
a necklace. 
The chimp swung from the rope in the 
cage. 
The chimp hung himself with a rope in 
the cage. 
The minister read the bible after dinner. The minister ate the bible during dinner. 
The teacher sat at the desk grading a 
paper. 
The teacher balanced the desk on the 
paper. 
The farmer left his hat by the tomatoes. The farmer made a hat out of tomatoes. 
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Appendix B: 
Vividness-Accuracy Analyses for Experiments 1-4 
General description of the analyses 
The relationship between vividness and memory accuracy was analyzed with 
respect to the sentence type and experimental condition. In order to realize this, each 
participant’s memory accuracy for each trial was dummy coded. If the participants 
remembered even only one noun from a sentence, their score was coded as 1, and if they 
could not remember any nouns from a sentence, their memory accuracy was coded as 0. 
Then, each participant’s vividness rating was averaged separately within accuracy and 
sentence type, giving four different scores for each participant: vividness ratings for 
bizarre inaccurate sentences, bizarre accurate sentences, common accurate sentences and 
common inaccurate sentences. Following this, two separate ANOVA analyses were 
conducted for bizarre and common sentences, accuracy as the within subjects factor, and 
the experimental condition as the between subjects. The results for each experiment are 
briefly explained below 
Experiment 1 vividness ratings 
The results revealed a significant main effect for accuracy (F(1,44) = 6.22, MSe = 
.31, p<.05) such that the bizarre accurate sentence had lower vividness ratings (M =2.90 
SD =.95) than bizarre inaccurate sentences (M =3.18 SD =.97). All the other effects were 
non-significant (Fs<1). For common sentences, the results yielded a reversed pattern for 
main effect of accuracy (F(1,44) = 4.87, MSe = .27, p<.05): Accurate sentences (M =4.12 
SD =.95) were rated more vividly than inaccurate sentences (M =3.90 SD =.89). Neither 
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the main effect of experimental group (F(3, 43) = 2.54, MSe = 1.29, p>.05) nor the 
interaction (F<1) reached significance.  
  Experiment 2 vividness ratings 
The analyses for bizarre sentences revealed a main effect for the experimental 
group, (F(1,87) = 3.97, MSe = 1.59, p <.05). Post hoc comparisons using Fisher’s LSD 
revealed that the participants in the control group (M =2.81, SD=.97) rated all sentences 
less vividly than the participants in the AS (M =3.4, SD=1.10) and spatial tapping (M 
=3.33, SD=.87) groups. All other effects were insignificant (Fs < 2). The analyses for 
common sentences revealed that there was a main effect for accuracy such that 
participants gave higher vividness ratings to accurate common sentences M =4.24, 
SD=.90)  than inaccurate common sentences (M =4.06, SD=.81) (F(1,87) = 6.81, MSe = 
.239, p <.05). None of the other effects reached significance (F < 1 for experimental 
condition; F(1,87) = 2.02, MSe = .239, p >.10 for interaction).   
Experiment 3 vividness ratings 
The analysis for the bizarre sentences revealed a marginally significant main 
effect for accuracy (F(1,30) = 3.58, MSe = .32, p=.068), with accurate sentences rated 
lower than inaccurate sentences. The other effects did not reach significance (F<2). The 
analysis for the common sentences revealed a different pattern. None of the main effects 
were significant, but the interaction between the two factors reached significance 
(F(1,30) = 5.59, MSe = .18, p<.05). The participants in the distraction group rated the 
accurate (M = 3.97, SD= .92) and the inaccurate sentences (M = 3.98, SD= .85) similarly, 
but the participants in the control group rated the accurate sentences (M = 4.28, SD= .67) 
as more vivid than the inaccurate sentences (M = 3.92, SD= .85) 
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Experiment 4 vividness ratings 
 The analysis for the bizarre sentences revealed no main effect for accuracy (F<1), 
a marginally significant main effect for experimental condition (F(1,22) = 3.80, MSe = 
2.057, p=.064), with the sentences in the control condition  (M = 2.90, SD = 1.07) rated 
less vividly than the sentences in the verbal condition  (M = 3.70, SD = 1.06) and no 
interaction (F(1,22) = 1.45, MSe = .21, p>.10). The analyses for the common sentences 
revealed no main effect for accuracy (F(1,22) = 1.16, MSe = .079, p>.10), no main effect 
for experimental condition (F<1) and a significant interaction between the two factors 
(F(1,22) = 10.21, MSe = .079, p<.01). Posthoc comparisons with paired samples t-test 
revealed that there was no difference in the ratings for inaccurate and accurate sentences 
in the verbal distraction condition (t(9) = 1.67, p>.10), but the ratings for the inaccurate 
sentences (M = 4.20, SD = .75) were significantly lower as compared to accurate 
sentences in the control condition (M = 4.58, SD = .64) (t(10) = 2.82, p<.05). 
  
118 
 
REFERENCES 
Anderson, D. C., & Buyer, L. S. (1994). Is imagery a functional component of the 
“bizarre imagery” phenomenon? The American Journal of Psychology, 107, 207-
222.  
Andrade, J., Kemps, E., Werniers, Y., May, J., & Szmalec, A. (2002). Insensitivity of 
visual short term memory to irrelevant visual information. Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 55A, 753–774. 
Auble, P. M., & Franks, J. J. (1978). Effect of effort toward comprehension on recall. 
Memory & Cognition, 6, 20-25. 
Auble, P. M., Franks, J. J., & Soraci, S. A. (1979). Effort toward comprehension: 
Elaboration or "aha!"? Memory & Cognition, 7, 426-434.  
Baddeley, A. D.  (2000). Working memory and the vividness of imagery. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 129, 126-145.  
Baddeley, A. D. (2003). Working memory: Looking back and looking forward. Nature 
reviews: Neuroscience, 4, 829-839.  
Baddeley, A.D., & Hitch, G. (1974). Working memory. In G. A. Bower (Ed. ), Recent 
advances in learning and motivation (pp. 47–90). New York: Academic Press. 
Baddeley, A. D., Logie, R.H., Bressi, S., Della Sala, S., & Spinnler, H. (1986). Senile 
dementia and working memory. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
38A, 603-618. 
Barnard, P.J., Scott, S.K., & May, J. (2001). When the central executive lets us down: 
Schemas, attention, and load in a generative working memory task. Memory, 9, 
209- 221. 
Begg, I., Duft, S., Lalonde, P., Melnick, R., & Sanvito, J. (1989). Memory predictions are 
based on ease of processing. Journal of Memory & Language, 28, 610-632. 
Bell, R., Buchner, A., & Mund, I. (2008). Age-related difference in irrelevant-speech 
effects. Psychology and Aging, 23, 377–391. 
Boyle, R., &  Coltheart, V. (1996). Effects of irrelevant sounds on phonological coding in 
reading comprehension and short-term memory. The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 49A, 398-416.   
Bugelski, B. R., Kidd, E., & Segmen, J. (1968). Image as a mediator in one-trial paired-
associate learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 76, 69-73.  
Burns, D. J. (1996). The bizarre imagery effect and intention to learn. Psychonomic 
Bulletin and Review, 3, 254-257.   
119 
 
Buzan, T. (1991). Use Your Perfect Memory: Dramatic New Techniques for Improving 
Your Memory.  NY: Penguin Publishing.  
Calvo, M. G., & Castillo, M. D. (1995). Phonological coding in reading comprehension: 
The importance of individual differences.  European Journal of Cognitive 
Psychology, 7, 365-382. 
Christoffels, I. K. (2006) Listening while talking: The retention of prose under 
articulatory suppression in relation to simultaneous interpreting. European 
Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 18, 206-220.  
Cocchini, G., Logie, R. H., Della Sala, S., & MacPherson, S. E. (2002). Concurrent 
performance of two memory tasks: Evidence for domain-specific working 
memory systems. Memory & Cognition, 30, 1086-1095. 
Collyer, S. C., Jonides, J., & Bevan, W. (1972). Images as memory aids: Is bizarreness 
helpful? The American Journal of Psychology, 85, 31-38. 
Cornoldi, C., Cavedon, A., De Beni, R., & Pra Baldi, A. (1988). The influence of the 
nature of material and of mental operations on the occurrence of the bizarreness 
effect. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 40A, 73-85. 
Cox, S. D., & Wollen, K. A. (1981). Bizarreness and recall. Bulletin of the Psychonomic 
Society, 13, 244-245.  
Delin, P.S. (1968). Success in recall as a function of success in implementation of 
mnemonic instructions. Psychonomic Science, 12, 153-154. 
Delin, P. S. (1969). An experiment examining list-learning with and without the 
mnemonic use of bizarre associations. Journal of General Psychology, 81, 249-
260. 
Della Sala, S., Gray, C., Baddeley, A., Allamano, N., & Wilson, L. (1999). Pattern span: 
A tool for unwelding visuo-spatial memory. Neuropsychologia, 37, 1189–1199. 
Engle, R. W. (2002). Working memory capacity as executive attention. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 11, 19-23. 
Einstein, G. O., & McDaniel, M. A.  (1987). Distinctiveness and the mnemonic benefits 
of bizarre imagery.  In M. A. McDaniel & M. Pressley (Eds.), Imagery and 
related mnemonic processes: Theories, individual differences, and applications 
(pp. 78-102).  New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Graf, R. (1980). Two consequences of generating: Increased inter- and intra-word 
organization of sentences. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 19, 
316-327.  
120 
 
Hanley, J. R., & Broadbent, C. (1987). The effects of unattended speech on serial recall 
following auditory presentation. British Journal of Psychology, 78, 287-297. 
Hanley, J. R., & Bakopoulou, E. (2003). Irrelevant speech, articulatory suppression, and 
phonological similarity: A test of the phonological loop model and the feature 
model. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 10, 435–444. 
Hertzog, C., Dunlosky, J., Robinson, A. E., & Kidder, D. P. (2003). Encoding fluency is 
a cue utilized for judgments about learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29, 22-34.  
Hirshman, E., Whelley, M. M., & Palij, M. (1989). An investigation of paradoxical 
memory effects. Journal of Memory & Language, 28, 594-609. 
Imai, S., & Richman, C.L. (1991). Is the bizarreness effect a special case of sentence 
reorganization. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 29, 429-432. 
Jones, D. M., Macken, W. J., & Nicholls, A. P. (2004). The Phonological Store of 
Working Memory: Is It Phonological and Is It a Store? Journal of Experimental 
Psychology:  Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 30, 656–674. 
Kroll, N., Schepeler, E. M., & Angin, K. T. (1986). Bizarre imagery: The 
misremembered mnemonic. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 12, 42-54. 
Kroll, N. E. A., & Tu, S.-F. (1988). The bizarre mnemonic. Psychological Research, 50, 
28-37. 
LeCompte, D. C. (1994). Extending the irrelevant speech effect beyond serial recall. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 20, 
1396-1408. 
Logie, R. H. (1986). Visuo-spatial processing in working memory. The Quarterly Journal 
of Experimental Psychology, 38A, 229-247.  
Logie, R. H., Zucco, G. M., & Baddeley, A. D. (1990). Interference with visual short-
term memory. Acta Psychologica, 75, 55-74.  
Lorayne, H. (2010). Ageless Memory: The Memory Expert's Prescription for a Razor-
Sharp Mind.  NY: Black Dog & Leventhal Publishers.  
Macken, W. J., & Jones, D. M. (1995). Functional characteristics of the inner voice and 
the inner ear: Single or double agency? Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 21, 436-448. 
Lorayne, H., & Lucas, J. (1974). The Memory Book. NY: Stein and Day.  
121 
 
Marshall, P. H., Nau, K. L., & Chandler, C. K. (1979). A structural analysis of common 
and visual mediators. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 14, 103-105.  
Marshall, P. H., Nau, K. L., & Chandler, C. K. (1979). A functional analysis of common 
and visual mediators. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 15, 375-377.  
McDaniel, M. A., & Bugg, J. M. (2008). Instability in memory phenomena: A common 
puzzle and a unifying explanation. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 15, 237–255. 
McDaniel, M. A., Dornburg, C. C., Guynn, M. J. (2005). Disentangling encoding versus 
retrieval explanations of the bizarreness effect: Implications for distinctiveness. 
Memory & Cognition, 33, 270-279.  
McDaniel, M. A., & Einstein, G. O. (1986). Bizarre imagery as an effective memory aid: 
The importance of distinctiveness. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 12, 54-65. 
McDaniel, M. A., Einstein, G. O., DeLosh, E. L., May, C. P., & Brady, P. (1995). The 
bizarreness effect: it’s not surprising, it’s complex.  Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 21(2), 422-435. 
Merry, R., & Graham, N. C. (1978). Imagery bizarreness in children’s recall of sentences. 
British Journal of Psychology, 69, 315-321.  
Nappe, G. W., & Wollen, K. A. (1973). Effects of instructions to form common and 
bizarre mental images on retention. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 100, 6-
8. 
Nicholas, S., & Worthen, J. B. (2009). Adult age differences in memory for distinctive 
information: evidence from the bizarreness effect. Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 62, 1983-1990.  
Oswald, C. J. P., Tremblay, S., & Jones, D. M. (2000). Disruption of comprehension by 
the meaning of irrelevant sound. Memory, 8, 345–350. 
Parker, A., & Dagnall, N. (2009). Concreteness effects revisited: The influence of 
dynamic visual noise on memory for concrete and abstract words. Memory, 17, 
397-410.  
Paivio, A. (1971). Imagery & verbal processes. New York: Holt, Rhinehart, & Winston. 
Paivio, A. (1991). Dual coding theory: Retrospect & current status. Canadian Journal of 
Psychology, 45, 255-287. 
Quinn, J. G., & McConnell, J. (1996). Irrelevant pictures in visual working memory. 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 49A, 200-215.  
122 
 
Quinn, J. G., & McConnell, J. (2006). The interval for interference in conscious visual 
imagery. Memory, 14, 241-252.  
Richardson, J. T. E., & Baddeley, A. D. (1975). The effect of articulatory suppression in 
free recall. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 14, 623-629.  
Richman, C. L. (1994). The bizarreness effect with complex sentences: Temporal effects. 
Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 48, 444-450.  
Robinson-Riegler, B., & McDaniel, M. A. (1994). Further constraints on the bizarreness 
effect: Elaboration at encoding. Memory & Cognition, 22, 702-712. 
Salame, P., & Baddeley, A. (1982). Disruption of short-term memory by unattended 
speech: Implications for the structure of working memory. Journal of Verbal 
Learning and Verbal Behavior, 21, 150-164. 
Salway, A. F. S., & Logie, R. H. (1995). Visuospatial working memory, movement 
control and executive demands. British Journal of Psychology, 86, 253-269.  
Schmidt, S. R. (1991). Can we have a distinctive theory of memory? Memory & 
Cognition, 19(6), 523-542. 
Smyth, M. M., Pearson, N.A., & Pendleton, L.R. (1988): Movement and working 
memory: Patterns and positions in space. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
40A, 497-514. 
Toppino, T. C., & Pisegna, A. (2005). Articulatory suppression and the irrelevant-speech 
effect in short-term memory: Does the locus of suppression matter? Psychonomic 
Bulletin & Review, 12, 374-379.  
Trudeau, K. (1997). Kevin Trudeau's Mega Memory: How to Release Your Superpower 
Memory in 30 Minutes or Less a Day. NY: William Morrow and Company.  
Van Gerven, P. W. M., Meijer, W. A., Vermeeren, A., Vuurman, E. F., & Jolles, J. 
(2007). The irrelevant speech effect and the level of interference in aging. 
Experimental Aging Research, 33, 323–339. 
Waddill, P. J., & McDaniel, M. A. (1998). Distinctiveness effects in recall: Differential 
processing and privileged retrieval? Memory & Cognition, 26, 108-120.  
Wallace, W. H., Turner, S. H., & Perkins, C. C. (1957).  Preliminary studies of human 
information  storage. Signal Corps Project No. 1326, Institute of Cooperative 
Research, University of Pennsylvania.  
Weir, D., & Richman, C. L. (1996). Subject-generated bizarreness: Imagery or semantic 
processing.  The American Journal of Psychology, 109, 173-185. 
123 
 
Wollen, K. A., & Cox, S. D. (1981). Sentence cueing and the effectiveness of bizarre 
imagery. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 7, 
386-392.  
Wollen, K. A., & Margres, M. G. (1987). Bizarreness and the imagery multiprocess 
model. In M. A. McDaniel & M. Pressley (Eds.), Imagery and related mnemonic 
processes: Theories, individual differences, and applications (pp. 103-128). New 
York: Springer-Verlag. 
Wollen, K. A., Weber, A., & Lowry, D. H. (1972). Bizarreness versus interaction of 
mental images as determinants of learning. Cognitive Psychology, 3, 518-523. 
Worthen, J. B. (1997). Resiliency of bizarreness effects under varying conditions of 
verbal and imaginal elaboration and processing mode. Journal of Mental 
Imagery, 21, 167-194.   
Worthen, J. B. (2006). Resolution of discrepant memory strengths: An explanation of the 
effects of bizarreness on memory. In R. R. Hunt & J. B. Worthen (Eds.), 
Distinctiveness and Memory. (pp. 65-88). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Worthen, J. B., & Deschamps, J. D. (2008). Humour mediates the facilitative effect of 
bizarreness in delayed recall. British Journal of Psychology, 99, 461-471.   
Worthen, J. B., Garcia-Rivas, G., Green, C. R., & Vidos, R. A. (2000). Tests of a 
cognitive-resource allocation account of the bizarreness effect. The Journal of 
General Psychology, 127, 117-144.  
Worthen, J. B., & Roark, B. (2002). Free recall accuracy for common and bizarre verbal 
information. The American Journal of Psychology, 115, 377-394.  
Yarmey, A. (1984) Bizarreness effects in mental imagery. In A. Sheikh (Ed.), 
International Review of Mental Imagery, Vol. 1 (pp. 57-76). New York: Human 
Sciences Press. 
Yates, F. A. (1966). The Art of Memory. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.  
Zaromb, F. M. & Roediger, H. L. (2009). The effects of ‘effort after meaning” on recall: 
Differences in within- and between-subjects designs. Memory & Cognition, 37, 
447-463. 
